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"TOO BIG TO REMEDY?"
RETHINKING MASS RESTITUTION FOR
SLAVERY AND JIM CROW
Kaimipono David Wenger*
Slavery and Jim Crow inflicted horrific harms on Blacks in
America. Official silence aggravated that harm, as neither victims nor
their descendants received monetary restitution, nor even (until very
recently) any official apology. Reparations advocates have repeatedly
called for compensation to slave descendants. But how exactly does
society compensate for slavery?
Of course, compensation for mass injustice is always difficult to
calculate and administer. Slavery puts the normal concerns of mass
compensation into sharp relief and adds a whole new set of unique
concerns for courts, legislators, and scholars.
In this Article, I use slavery and Jim Crow harms as a case study
to examine some of the difficult questions that arise in mass restitution
cases. I argue that some reparative action is needed in the case of
slavery and Jim Crow; the longstanding lack of response only
reinscribes injury. However, traditional tort compensation is
inadequate. Victims cannot be truly compensated-only symbolic
restitution is possible. Ultimately, slavery and Jim Crow seem "too big
to remedy " under the legal system.
Because true restitution is impossible, we must consider other
options based on our ideas of justice. Thus, responding to slavery
challenges us to rethink both the goals of restitution and our underlying
conceptions of justice. Reparative measures, while they cannot make
victims whole, can play important roles in society and benefit victims in
other ways. I examine how the goals of restitution can be advanced
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though various non-tort or otherwise non-traditional approaches,
including restorative justice and atonement, microreparations and
apology, storytelling, and the traditional Hawaiian remedy of
ho'oponopono.
Just as some insurance companies may be viewed as "too big to
fail,"' are there some mass harms that are simply "too big to
remedy"?I This Article examines that question using the lens of claims
arising from slavery and Jim Crow.
1. On the origin of the "too big to fail" phrase, see Thomas L. Friedman, Op-Ed., The Price
Is Not Right, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2009, at A3 1.
2. I am indebted to Marc Galanter for suggesting the phrase "too big to remedy." See also
Marc Galanter, Righting Old Wrongs, in BREAKING THE CYCLES OF HATRED: MEMORY, LAW,
AND REPAIR 107, 107-10 (Martha Minow ed., 2002) (discussing historical efforts to reform past
harms).
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I. HARMS OF SLAVERY AND JIM CROW
Slavery and Jim Crow inflicted horrific harms upon Blacks' in
America. Slaves were subjected to physical injury, mental anguish,
loss of property, loss of wages, loss of liberty, and loss of family
relations.' Slave families .were destroyed, and slave women were
regularly subjected to rape and reproductive abuse.' The entire
system of slavery depended upon a series of massive deprivations of
basic human rights.
A number of scholars have provided extensive evidence of the
human rights violations that slavery created here in the United States,
and also of the extensive official participation in the process. For
instance, we can read chilling accounts of courthouse slave auctions,
enforcement of fugitive slave laws, and many other instances of
widespread brutality and inhumanity carried out by still-extant state
entities.' Slavery was not a minor wrinkle or a quirky anomaly;
rather, it was "deeply embedded in the social, political and legal
structure of the nation."7
Slavery as an institution also inflicted harm on society, severely
undermining the rule of law in America. Government entities were
directly and intimately involved in enforcing this regime and in
3. Throughout this Article I will use the term "Black" rather than "black" or "African-
American." Cf Kimberld W. Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and
Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARv. L. REV. 1331, 1332 n.2 (1988) ("1 shall use
'African-American' and 'Black' interchangeably. When using 'Black,' I shall use an upper-case
'B' to reflect my view that Blacks, like Asians, Latinos, and other 'minorities,' constitute a
specific cultural group and, as such, require denotation as a proper noun.").
4. See Keith N. Hylton, Slavery and Tort Law, 84. B.U. L. REV. 1209, 1213-37 (2004)
(discussing types of harms arising from slavery); Anthony J. Sebok, Two Concepts of Injustice in
Reparations for Slavery, 84 B.U. L. REV. 1405, 1417 (2004); Kevin Hopkins, Forgive US. Our
Debts? Righting the Wrongs of Slavery, 89 GEO. L.J. 2531, 2534 (2001) ("[T]he wrongs done to
African slaves during slavery, such as the physical capture and exploitation of Africans for labor,
the inhumane treatment and abuse of slaves by white slaveholders, and the psychological abuses
in failing to acknowledge and respect African personhood, to name only a few, were horrible and
unfathomable."); see also ALFRED L. BROPHY, REPARATIONS PRO AND CON 19-40 (2006)
(describing the harms of slavery).
5. See Pamela D. Bridgewater, Ain't I a Slave: Slavery, Reproductive Abuse, and
Reparations, 14 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 89, 126-28 (2005).
6. See Paul Finkelman, Introduction to SLAVERY AND THE LAW 3, 14-19 (Paul Finkelman
ed., Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 2002) (1997).
7. Id at 4; see also PAUL FINKELMAN, SLAVERY AND THE FOUNDERS: RACE AND LIBERTY
IN THE AGE OF JEFFERSON 3-13 (2d ed. 2001) (describing the degree to which support for slavery
was not aberrational, but rather well understood and accepted by the founders).
8. See Kaimipono David Wenger, Reparations Within the Rule ofLaw, 29 T. JEFFERSON L.
REV. 231, 232-39 (2007).
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inflicting egregious harms on slaves. The regime of slavery restricted
Black participation in society and undermined Black confidence in
the rule of law.' "It involved the creation and maintenance of a legal
regime that removed rights from one class of citizens and allowed
others to treat them as property." "
Jim Crow continued the legacy of slavery and its
marginalization of Blacks. " During Jim Crow, Blacks suffered a
number of specific harms, including voter suppression,12 peonage
and slave-like convict-labor practices, " segregation and cultural
theft,14 educational inequity," violence and lynching, 6 and many
other effects of racism. "
9. Roy L. BROOKS, ATONEMENT AND FORGIVENESS: A NEW MODEL FOR BLACK
REPARATIONS 38-40, 201-04 (2004); see Joe R. Feagin, Documenting the Costs of Slavery,
Segregation, and Contemporary Racism: Why Reparations Are in Order for African Americans,
20 HARv. BLACKLETrER L.J. 49, 51, 78-79 (2004); Eric Miller, Taking Reparations Seriously:
Reparations Manifesto, Presentation at the Thomas Jefferson School of Law (Mar. 20, 2006) (on
file with author).
10. Wenger, supra note 8, at 232; see alsoBROOKS, supra note 9, at 133-34.
11. See BROPHY, supra note 4, at 35-36 (discussing Jim Crow harms); Kaimipono David
Wenger, From Radical to Practical (and Back Again?): Reparations, Rhetoric and Revolution 33-
35 (2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://works.bepress.com/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context-kaimipono wenger/.
12. See generally Gabriel J. Chin & Randy Wagner, The Tyranny of the Minority: Jim Crow
and the Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 65, 87-94 (2008) (giving
history of disenfranchisement of Black voters in the South, even in majority areas); id. at 122 ("In
violation of the letter and spirit of the Constitution, African Americans were denied the
opportunity to control or significantly influence Southern governments following the Civil War.
That injury violated the democratic principles that the U.S. Constitution established.").
On racialized use of criminal law to suppress voting, see JEFF MANZA & CHRISTOPHER
UGGEN, LOCKED OUT: FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 64-79
(2006) and Gabriel J. Chin, Felon Disenfranchisement and Democracy in the Late Jim Crow Era,
5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 329, 334-37 (2007), both of which discuss the racial effects of felon
disenfranchisement in the Jim Crow era.
13. See DOUGLAS A. BLACKMON, SLAVERY BY ANOTHER NAME: THE RE-ENSLAVEMENT
OF BLACK PEOPLE IN AMERICA FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO WORLD WAR II 355-56, 360 (2008);
Aziz Z. Huq, Note, Peonage and Contractual Liberty, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 351, 352-55 (2001)
(discussing history of peonage).
14. See generally K.J. Greene, "Copynorms," Black Cultural Production, and the Debate
over African-American Reparations, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1179, 1187-89 (2008)
(describing how Black cultural property, especially music, was unjustly appropriated).
15. See generally Maurice Dyson, When Government Is a Passive Participant in Private
Discrimination: A Critical Look at White Privilege and the Tacit Return to Interposition in PICS
v. Seattle School District, 40 U. TOL. L. REV. 145, 176-77 (2008) (describing the Supreme
Court's recent jurisprudence regarding racial desegregation of schools).
16. See Emma Coleman Jordan, A History Lesson: Reparations for What?, 58 NYU ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 557, 557-59, 566, 612-13 (2003); see also SHERRILYN IFILL, ON THE
COURTHOUSE LAWN: CONFRONTING THE LEGACY OF LYNCHING IN THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY 8-16, 20-56 (2007) (describing the mob lynching mentality on Maryland's Eastern
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One important subset of Jim Crow harms was mass violence
inflicted on Black communities, often with the complicity of local
authorities. One of the most well-known examples took place in
Tulsa, Oklahoma, where in 1921 white rioters destroyed the
prosperous Black section of town and killed hundreds of Blacks,
while thousands more were driven from the city as their homes and
businesses burned. " The Black section of Tulsa was completely
destroyed. Local police and militia aided the rioters by providing
weapons and by attacking Blacks. " Similar incidents took place in
Rosewood, Florida; East St. Louis, Illinois; Chicago, Illinois;
Wilmington, North Carolina; and Colfax, Louisiana. 20 Each incident
Shore between 1931 and 1933 and highlighting the story of the thwarted attempt to lynch accused
rapist Isaiah Fountain); Rhonda V. Magee, The Master's Tools, from the Bottom Up: Responses
to African-American Reparations Theory in Mainstream and Outsider Remedies Discourse, 79
VA. L. REV. 863, 894 (1993) (describing the "post-Reconstruction terrorism" of beatings and
lynchings).
17. Gabriel J. Chin, Jim Crow's Long Goodbye, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 107, 126 (2004) ("In
large part because of Jim Crow's gradual rather than abrupt decline, even at the level of formal,
written law there was never a systematic, sustained effort to identify the scope of racial
discrimination and eliminate all of its manifestations."). Incredibly, a large number of Jim Crow-
era segregation laws remain on the books in Southern states. Though these laws are not enforced,
their continued existence is troubling. Some attempts to remove them from legal codes have
succeeded, but others have not. See Gabriel J. Chin et al., Still on the Books: Jim Crow and
Segregation Laws Fifty Years After Brown v. Board of Education, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 457,
462-75 (cataloguing Jim Crow segregation laws that remained on the books as of 2004, as well as
the mixed results of reports to state legislatures about those laws); cf David Lyons, Corrective
Justice, Equal Opportunity, and the Legacy of Slavery and Jim Crow, 84 B.U. L. REV. 1375,
1388-97 (2004) (describing post-Civil War acts).
18. ALFRED L. BROPHY, RECONSTRUCTING THE DREAMLAND: THE TULSA RIOT OF 1921-
RACE, REPARATION, RECONCILIATION, at xvii (2002); BROPHY, supra note 4, at 128. See
generally OKLA. COMM'N, TULSA RACE RIOT: A REPORT BY THE OKLAHOMA COMMISSION TO
STUDY THE TULSA RACE RIOT OF 1921 (2001), available at http://www.okhistory.org/
trrc/freport.pdf (outlining the 1921 Tulsa Race Riot Commission's findings and its
recommendations for reparations). The event is colloquially known as the Tulsa Race Riot. That
term conjures images of Watts or the like, which is misleading. Tulsa was more of an organized
and efficient expulsion of a group of people, akin to a pogrom or massacre. See Okla. Historical
Soc'y, Tulsa Race Riot, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF OKLA. HISTORY & CULTURE,
http://digital.library.okstate.edulencyclopedia/entries/T/TUO13.html (last visited Aug. 23, 2010).
19. BROPHY, supra note 4, at 128.
20. See id. at 50-51 (describing Rosewood); Kenneth B. Nunn, Rosewood, in WHEN SORRY
ISN'T ENOUGH 435-36 (Roy L. Brooks ed.1999) (same). See generally CHARLES LANE, THE
DAY FREEDOM DIED: THE COLFAX MASSACRE, THE SUPREME COURT, AND THE BETRAYAL OF
RECONSTRUCTION (2008) (describing Colfax); LERAE UMFLEET, 1898 WILMINGTON RACE RIOT
COMM'N, 1898 WILMINGTON RACE RIOT REPORT (2006), available at
http://www.history.ncdcr.gov/1898-wrrc/report/report.htm (considering the commission's
findings regarding the riot and its economic impact on Blacks in North Carolina); Kaimipono
David Wenger, Towards Microreparations (2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author)
(discussing massive Jim Crow harms in these communities).
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was then buried, effectively erasing the stories of those communities
from the public consciousness.21
Slave descendants suffer today from residual racism, a
consequence of slavery and Jim Crow.22 According to the 2000
census, levels of poverty and high school dropout rates among
Blacks remain double those among whites. 23 As a group, the per
capita income and higher-education rates of Blacks are
approximately half those of whites.24 For example, Black median
family income in 1998 was $29,404, while white median family
income was $49,023.25 In 1999, the incarceration rate of Black males
was eight times higher than that of white males. 26 Department of
Justice statistics show that in 1997 Blacks as a whole had a
16.2 percent chance of going to prison at some point in their lives,
compared with a 2.5 percent chance for whites.27 Among homicide
defendants, the chances that a Black defendant will be charged with a
capital crime and receive the death penalty continue to rise.28
Slavery and Jim Crow also led to the exclusion of Blacks from
political power.29 Blacks were forced to struggle for the civil rights
they eventually received under law." To this day, Black exclusion
from meaningful participation in the political process continues, as
does Black distrust in the rule of law in America."
In summation, the accumulated effects of slavery, Jim Crow,
residual racism, and official silence have continued the
marginalization and subordination of the Black community.
21. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
22. See, e.g., Kaimipono David Wenger, Slavery as a Takings Clause Violation, 53 AM. U.
L. REV. 191, 224-26 (2003).






29. See Feagin, supra note 9, at 54.
30. See JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE COURTS 212-24, 509-12 (1994).
31. BROOKS, supra note 9, at 169-71; ROY BROOKS, RACIAL JUSTICE IN THE AGE OF
OBAMA 89-108 (2009).
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II. LEGAL CLAIMS FOR RESTITUTION
Since slavery ended, advocates have sought redress for the
harms it caused.32 Some of the suggested remedies, such as Marcus
Garvey's movement for land in Africa, were radical in nature, while
others were purely political in scope.33 However, a number of the
claims for restitution have been legal in nature. Advocates framed
these claims using legal language and positioned them within
traditional legal structures. This part describes some of those legal
claims for redress. Section A describes several of the most important
reparations lawsuits. Section B catalogues some of the important
legal theories used by reparations advocates. Finally, Section C gives
a brief recap and summary of the legal developments.
A. Legal Theories for Reparations
Over the past several decades, reparations advocates have
suggested bringing claims for restitution for slavery and Jim Crow
under a variety of legal theories. The two major strands are tort and
unjust enrichment.34
Tort claims are relatively straightforward. Slavery clearly
involved a large number of actions that meet the standard definitions
of intentional torts." These tort claims underlie a number of
reparations proposals. For instance, Randall Robinson describes the
harms of slavery in arguing that the aggregate unpaid labor that
32. See Wenger, supra note 11, at 4-10.
33. Id. at 18.
34. This is generally recognized in the literature. See, e.g., Alfred Brophy, Some Conceptual
and Legal Problems in Reparations for Slavery, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 497, 516 (2002)
("As to substantive basis, the most commonly cited bases are unjust enrichment and tort.").
Other theories are also possible. Some commentators have suggested bringing human
rights claims. For example, in provocative language that evokes the possibility of a human rights
claim, Randall Robinson suggests that slavery was "[a] massive crime against humanity[,] ... an
American holocaust." RANDALL ROBINSON, THE DEBT: WHAT AMERICA OWES TO BLACKS 33
(2000). And in another article, I have argued that slave descendants could seek recompense under
the takings clause for taken self-ownership. Wenger, supra note 22. Despite these and other
intimations, the two dominant approaches in reparations thus far are tort and unjust enrichment.
35. The murders, assaults, kidnappings, and rapes involved would satisfy the tort of battery,
for instance. See generally Judith Kelleher Schafer, "Details Are ofa Most Revolting Character":
Cruelty to Slaves as Seen in Appeals to the Supreme Court of Louisiana, in SLAVERY AND THE
LAW 241 (Paul Finkelman ed., 2002) ("[E]xcessive violence and cruel treatment of slaves was not
uncommon in Louisiana."); Hylton, supra note 4, at 1213-37 (discussing types of harms arising
from slavery).
184
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slaves performed created a debt, payable by America to Blacks.36
Similarly, in his 1998 article Many Billions Gone," Robert Westley
argued that it was time to "reconsider and revitalize the discussion of
reparations" using tort claims to "map[] a legal path to enforcement
of Black reparations."" Other advocates make similar arguments."
Unjust enrichment claims, on the other hand, require a claimant
to show only that a defendant unjustly obtained some benefit from
the claimant and that the benefit should be refunded.40 The measure
of damages is the amount of unjust gain.41 Unjust enrichment claims
provide certain tactical advantages in mass compensation litigation
and have been successfully used in Holocaust and tobacco cases.
However, advocates disagree about their appropriateness in the
reparations context4 2 because they also may create particular
disadvantages.43
36. ROBINSON, supra note 34, at 1-10. Robinson's book was instrumental in helping further
popularize the topic of reparations. See, e.g., BROPHY, supra note 4, at 69-71 (discussing the
effects of Robinson's book).
37. Robert Westley, Many Billions Gone: Is It Time to Reconsider the Case for Black
Reparations?, 40 B.C. L. REv. 429, 432 (1998).
38. Id. at 432-33.
39. See generally BROOKS, supra note 9, at 98-140 (discussing the tort model of
reparations); Kaimipono David Wenger, Causation and Attenuation in the Slavery Reparations
Debate, 40 U.S.F. L. REv. 279, 283-84 (2006) (discussing tort approaches to reparations).
40. Sebok, supra note 4, at 1427 ("The minimum requirements for a claim of unjust
enrichment based on quantum meruit are: (1) A benefit conferred upon the defendant by the
plaintiff; (2) an appreciation or knowledge of the benefit by the defendant; and (3) the acceptance
or retention by the defendant of the benefit under such circumstances as to make it inequitable for
the defendant to retain the benefit without payment of its value."); see also Brophy, supra note
34, at 521 (discussing reparations advocates' arguments in favor of using an unjust enrichment
framework); Anthony J. Sebok, Reparations, Unjust Enrichment, and the Importance of Knowing
the Difference Between the Two, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 651, 654-55 (2003) [hereinafter
Sebok, Knowing the Difference] (discussing the history of unjust enrichment).
41. See Anthony Sebok, Prosaic Justice, LEGAL AFF. Sept.-Oct. 2002, at 51, 51; Emily
Sherwin, Reparations and Unjust Enrichment, 84 B.U. L. REV. 1443, 1447-49 (2004).
42. Compare Sebok, supra note 4, at 1440-42 (suggesting that restitution for deceased
persons such as slaves is not conceptually coherent and should be avoided), and Sherwin, supra
note 41, at 1454-65 (arguing that unjust enrichment reparations claims are inappropriate because
they rely on resentment and retaliation), with Hanoch Dagan, Restitution and Slavery: On
Incomplete Commodification, Intergenerational Justice, and Legal Transitions, 84 B.U. L. REv.
1139, 1158-63 (2004) (arguing that restitution claims are descendible and appropriate in the
reparations context), and Feagin, supra note 9, at 49-5 1 (arguing in favor of reparations under an
unjust enrichment model).
43. See Sebok, Knowing the Difference, supra note 40, at 654-55 (acknowledging that
statute of limitations problems are not avoidable simply by using a claim of equity, although
courts are willing to bend statutes of limitations under certain circumstances); see also Sebok,
supra note 4, at 1418 (noting that states in the tobacco litigation used unjust enrichment claims
since these were less susceptible to affirmative defenses than suits for personal injury). They may
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Both tort and unjust enrichment approaches to slavery
reparations drew explicitly on previous mass restitution cases. For
instance, Alfred Brophy noted,
A . .. factor leading to the reinvigoration of talk about
reparations for slavery and Jim Crow are the models of
reparations that other groups-Native Americans,
Holocaust victims, Japanese Americans interned during
World War II, South Africans-have obtained....
[A]dvocates of reparations for slavery have drawn from
other reparations precedents."
Westley also cited Japanese Americans and Holocaust victims as
potential precedents.4 5 The prior precedents were important in the
development of the legal reparations narrative. Reparations
advocates hoped to build upon past instances of mass restitution.46
Some advocates also suggested other potential legal avenues for
compensation. For instance, Boris Bittker argued that desegregation
claims might be brought under § 1983.47 Similarly, I have argued
that a takings clause remedy might be available. 48 Finally, some
advocates have proposed using human rights law approaches.49
have other tactical advantages. Sherwin, supra note 41, at 1448-51 (discussing other advantages
of unjust enrichment claims, including serving as a vehicle for novel legal claims, avoiding
problems of proof that affect compensation claims, allowing the plaintiff to bring forth a claim
without the burden of proving the defendant is a wrongdoer, and being less vulnerable to
objections based on harm and responsibility).
Unjust enrichment was included in the Holocaust cases through a circuitous route-the
cases were originally replevin claims, and restitution was later added as an additional effective
tool. Sebok, supra note 4, at 1407. The restitution claims ended up playing a central role in the
Holocaust cases. See id. at 1408; see also Sebok, supra note 41, at 52 (explaining the success of
the unjust enrichment claims in the context of the Holocaust slave-labor cases). Unjust
enrichment claims, however, are uniquely susceptible to equitable defenses. Sebok, Knowing the
Difference, supra note 40, at 655. They are also subject to difficulties when a long period has
passed since the initial injustice, including problems of proof, fairness, and logic. Sherwin, supra
note 41, at 1451-53. In addition, advocates caution that reducing the discussion of slavery
reparations claims to unjust enrichment claims and matters of property runs the risk of degrading
the human values at stake. Sebok, Knowing the Difference, supra note 40, at 657; Sebok, supra
note 41, at 52-53.
44. Brophy, supra note 34, at 499-501 (discussing why the reparations movement has
gained substantial strength in both academic and political discussions in the last fifteen years).
45. See Westley, supra note 37, at 449-58.
46. Wenger, supra note I1, at 24.
47. BORIS I. BITTKER, THE CASE FOR BLACK REPARATIONS 135-37 (Beacon Press 2003)
(1973); see also Magee, supra note 16, at 901-03 (discussing Bittker's analysis of using § 1983
as a foundation for reparations).
48. Wenger, supra note 22, 249-50.
49. See BROOKS, supra note 9, at 133.
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There were some important conceptual and structural obstacles
to the major legal claims for redress. For one, it was unclear whether
slave owners owed a legal duty to slaves (or slave descendants), a
condition necessary before tort liability arises." Showing causation
was also a major problem because it is unclear, as Brophy notes,
"whether tort law would provide compensation for harm to
subsequent generations" after harm.5" Ultimately, the tort approach
to reparations becomes entangled in difficult questions of causation,
including how to link modem claimants with slave ancestors. Unjust
enrichment legal claims also were limited in their scope and faced
descendability problems. " Moreover, all of the claims faced a
variety of procedural hurdles, particularly statutes of limitation.53
Brophy's 2006 book, Reparations Pro and Con, gives the best
explanation and analysis of legal claims relating to reparations.
Brophy sets out in detail the legal issues presented by these lawsuits,
the types of claims brought, and the types of defendants, plaintiffs,
and damages, as well as the differences between tort and unjust
enrichment claims. 54 Furthermore, he discusses questions of
causation that arise in the reparations context," specific defenses like
the statute of limitations, 5 6 and specific rulings from courts in
reparations cases."
50. If no duty were owed to either slaves or to future generations (or to some other party
harmed under slavery), then there would be no tort claim. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER
AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 301-20 (W. Page Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984) (noting the
need to establish duty). In addition, if the duty owed to a party were particularly weak, it could be
viewed as affecting other aspects of tort liability, such as causation. See generally Brophy, supra
note 34, at 516 nn.84-85 (discussing conceptual problems with tort liability for slavery).
51. See BROPHY, supra note 4, at 108; see also Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom:
Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323, 374-85 (1987)
(addressing the issue of whether subsequent generations can recover under tort law by arguing
that a horizontal connection exists within the victim and perpetrator groups for purposes of
reparations claims).
52. See Matsuda, supra note 51, at 374-85.
53. See BROPHY, supra note 4, at 102-03 (noting that the statute of limitations is the most
difficult hurdle).
54. Id. at97-117.
55. Id. at 101-02.
56. Id. at 102-03.
57. Id. at 117-33 (discussing reparations lawsuits, including Japanese Americans'
internment suits, Holocaust-Era suits, and slavery and Jim Crow suits, as well as other reparations
litigation).
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B. Reparations Lawsuits
Advocates put these theories to the test, seeking redress in a
variety of lawsuits." This section sets out three of the most important
reparations suits: Cato v. United States,59 In re African-American
Slave Descendants Litigation,60 and Alexander v. Oklahoma.'
1. Cato v. United States
Not surprisingly, some lawsuits targeted government actors
complicitly tied to slavery. Government involvement in slavery was
extensive and created horrific consequences.62 Government actors
were involved in enforcement of slave laws, and slavery was a huge
financial benefit for government entities. The plaintiffs in Cato
sought redress from the United States "for damages due to the
enslavement of African Americans and subsequent discrimination
against them, for an acknowledgement of discrimination, and for an
apology."" In particular, the complaint sought
compensation of $100,000,000 for forced, ancestral
indoctrination into a foreign society; kidnapping of
ancestors from Africa; forced labor; breakup of families;
removal of traditional values; deprivations of freedom; and
imposition of oppression, intimidation, miseducation and
lack of information about various aspects of their
indigenous character. [Plaintiffs] also request[] that the
court order an acknowledgment of the injustice of slavery
in the United States and in the 13 American colonies
between 1619 and 1865, as well as of the existence of
discrimination against freed slaves and their descendants
from the end of the Civil War to the present. In addition,
[Plaintiffs] seek[] an apology from the United States."
However, the Ninth Circuit dismissed the Cato case. The court
found the complaint deficient for a number of substantive reasons.
58. Id. at 117-40 (discussing reparations lawsuits).
59. 70 F.3d 1103 (9th Cir. 1995).
60. 375 F. Supp. 2d 721 (N.D. 111. 2005).
61. 382 F.3d 1026 (10th Cir. 2004).
62. See Wenger, supra note 22, at 215-18.
63. Cato, 70 F.3d at 1105; see also BROPHY, supra note 4, at 121-23 (discussing Cato);
Wenger, supra note 22, at 248, 256-58 (same).
64. Cato, 70 F.3d at 1106.
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The major problem was sovereign immunity: the complaint "does
not refer to any basis upon which the United States might have
consented to suit" and "neither identifies any constitutional or
statutory right that was violated, nor asserts any basis for federal
subject matter jurisdiction or waiver of sovereign immunity," leading
to its dismissal on sovereign immunity grounds.65 In addition, the
plaintiffs' claim was brought too late,66 and "[w]ithout a concrete,
personal injury that [was] not abstract and that [was] fairly traceable
to the government conduct that she challenge[d] as unconstitutional,
Cato lack[ed] standing."6 7 The court concluded with a broad
assessment that "the legislature, rather than the judiciary, is the
appropriate forum for this relief."6 8
2. In re African-American Slave Descendants Litigation
While Cato was a setback, it left the door open to suits against
private actors, who cannot use sovereign immunity as a defense. In
addition, Cato predated the shift in mass restitution that occurred in
the late 1990s, when innovative legal strategies and claims of unjust
enrichment resulted in an eventual settlement and reparations for
Holocaust victims.69 Advocates suggested that similar strategies
could be used in the Black reparations movement. "
In 2002, Deadria Farmer-Paellman filed suit in federal court,
seeking reparations from a variety of corporate defendants under tort
and unjust enrichment theories. " The corporate claims were
consolidated to the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois,
which dismissed the consolidated claims in Slave Descendants,
finding that the claims were barred by a variety of legal hurdles,
including standing and statute of limitations.7 2 Despite academic
65. Id
66. Id at 1106-08.
67. Id at 1109.
68. Id at 1111.
69. BROPHY, supra note 4, at 45-46; see Sebok, supra note 4, at 1406.
70. Sebok, supra note 4, at 1416-18.
71. Complaint and Jury Trial Demand at 7, Farmer-Paellmann v. FleetBoston Fin. Corp., No.
CV-02-1862 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2002); see BROPHY, supra note 4, at 123-25; Dagan, supra note
42, at 1158-63; Sebok, supra note 4, at 1427; Wenger, supra note 39, at 297-301.
72. BROPHY, supra note 4, at 124; Wenger, supra note 39, at 316-26.
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criticism of that ruling," it remained essentially unchanged in the
district court's later decisions. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit then affirmed the dismissal of the major claims. 4
The district court in Slave Descendants dismissed claims based
on the lack of causal connection between defendants' actions and
plaintiffs' harms. The court wrote, "Plaintiffs cannot establish a
personal injury sufficient to confer standing by merely alleging some
genealogical relationship to African-Americans held in slavery over
one-hundred, two-hundred, or three-hundred years ago.""
Ultimately, the district court was unwilling to find liability where
causation was this attenuated. The appellate court agreed, writing
that "this causal chain is too long and has too many weak links for a
court to be able to find that the defendants' conduct harmed the
plaintiffs at all, let alone in an amount that could be estimated
without the wildest speculation.""
The statute of limitations was also a fatal barrier." The Slave
Descendants court noted:
Many of the torts set out in the instant complaint occurred
prior to the formal end of chattel slavery in the United
States of America. These claims would have accrued by
1865 at the latest. The longest limitations period for any of
Plaintiffs' claim is ten years, which would have run well
over a century prior to the filing of the instant Complaint. If
cognizable claims ever existed, those claims were owned by
former slaves themselves, and became time-barred when
the statutes of limitations expired in the nineteenth century.
73. See Wenger, supra note 39, at 316-26. See generally James R. Hackney, Jr., Ideological
Conflict, African American Reparations, Tort Causation and the Case for Social Welfare
Transformation, 84 B.U. L. REv. 1193, 1194-1201 (2004) (discussing general problems with
bringing slavery reparations lawsuits).
74. In re African-American Slave Descendants Litig., 471 F.3d 754, 763 (7th Cir. 2006).
One peripheral claim relating to fraud was not dismissed. Id.; see also Farmer-Paellman v. Brown
& Williamson Tobacco Corp., 552 U.S. 941 (2007) (denying certiorari).
75. In re African-American Slave Descendants Litig., 375 F. Supp. 2d at 752.
76. In re African-American Slave Descendants Litig., 471 F.3d at 759.
77. There are potential ways around the statutes of limitations in some cases; as Brophy
notes, courts could toll the statute, or legislators could pass legislation allowing a suit to go
forward. BROPHY, supra note 4, at 126-27. None of those avenues have been adopted by courts.
Id.
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As such, Plaintiffs' century-old claims are barred by the
statutes of limitation in every jurisdiction."
Ultimately, the court ruled that plaintiffs were entitled to no legal
remedy.
3. Alexander v. Oklahoma
In 2003, advocates filed suit seeking compensation in
Alexander.7 9 Although the riot had been buried for decades, the Tulsa
Race Riot Commission's 1997 investigation and subsequent 2001
report detailed the government's involvement in the massacre and
provided hundreds of pages of history about the previously little-
known event. o The Commission recommended various responses,
including some types of reparations;"1 however, the legislature
passed a more limited bill that did not include any reparations. 82
In response, advocates filed suit in Alexander, but that case was
also dismissed." Like other cases, it was unable to avoid the statute
of limitations. 8
C. Lawsuit Failures in General
To date, no lawsuit for slavery reparations has succeeded, and
only one major post-slavery reparations lawsuit has had any
success. " The Black farmers' case, Pigford v. Glickman,"6 resulted
in a settlement, but that case is anomalous in many ways. " For
example, it covered egregious discrimination during a period after
78. In re African-American Slave Descendants Litig., 304 F. Supp. 2d 1027, 1070 (N.D. Ill.
2004) (citations omitted).
79. See BROPHY, supra note 4, at 128-32 (describing Alexander lawsuit).
80. See Jim Yardley, Panel Recommends Reparation in Long-Ignored Tulsa Race Riot, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 5, 2000, at Al; Okla. Historical Soc'y, supra note 18.
81. FRANK KEATING ET AL., TULSA RACE RIOT: A REPORT BY THE OKLAHOMA
COMMISSION TO STUDY THE TULSA RACE RIOT OF 1921, at ii (2001), available at
http://www.okhistory.org/trrc/freport.pdf.
82. See BROPHY, supra note 18, at 117.
83. BROPHY, supra note 4, at 131-32.
84. See id.
85. BROOKS, supra note 9, at 119 (describing lawsuits).
86. See Pigford v. Glickman, 182 F.R.D. 341 (D.D.C. 1999) (approving settlement); Pigford
v. Glickman, 206 F.3d 1212 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (discussing settlement history). See generally
Tadlock Cowan & Jody Feder, The Pigford Cases: USDA Settlement of Discrimination Suits by
Black Farmers, Congressional Research Service, Dec. 10, 2010, available at
http://www.nationalaglawcenter.org/assets/crs/RS20 4 3 0.pdf.
87. See BROPHY, supra note 4, at 132.
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the end of Jim Crow (through the 1980s and 1990s); and even in that
case, armed with a formal settlement, claimants struggled to receive
compensation. "
III. THE REPARATIONS DILEMMA
Claims for restitution for slavery and Jim Crow create a
dilemma of sorts. They are neither easily granted nor easily denied,
and serious problems arise for either answer. This part will examine
this reparations dilemma.
A. Problems with Denying Restitution
There are serious problems with denying claims for slavery
reparations. Slavery was a massive violation of human rights.
Normally, our legal system requires that society address rights
violations-even for relatively minor violations. Of course, legal
avenues vary depending on the specifics of a particular case.
However, as Judge Jack B. Weinstein notes, "It is important to recall
the central theme of our legal system: ubi jus, ibi remedium-every
violation of a right should have a remedy in court."" This idea has
substantial support in the common law.90 Professor John C.P.
Goldberg goes even further, arguing that there is a constitutional
right to tort law remedies. 91 He argues that under the Due Process
Clause, "American citizens have a right to a body of law for the
redress of private wrongs."9
88. BROOKS, supra note 9, at 124-30; BROPHY, supra note 4, at 132; see Associated Press,
Deal Nearer for Farmers in Bias Case, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2010, at B2.
89. Jack B. Weinstein, The Role ofJudges in a Government of by, and for the People: Notes
for the Fifty-Eighth Cardozo Lecture, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 166 (2008).
90. See John C.P. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of Tort Law: Due Process and the
Right to a Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. 524, 532 (2005); Natsu Taylor Saito, At
the Heart of the Law: Remedies for Massive Wrongs, 27 REV. LITIG. 281, 300-05 (2008)
(discussing the history of the idea).
91. See Goldberg, supra note 90, at 596 (arguing that there is a constitutional right to a tort
remedy for the redress of private wrongs).
92. See id. at 524. This idea is not universally accepted. See McLaughlin v. Am. Tobacco
Co., 522 F.3d 215, 219 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting FDA v. Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120
(2000)) (reversing certification of a class of light cigarette smoker plaintiffs); Weinstein, supra
note 89, at 166 n.813 (citations omitted) (noting that the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
has written that "not every wrong can have a legal remedy . .. at least not without causing
collateral damage to the fabric of our laws"). On a similar note, Marc Galanter writes that
"[r]emedies cost in time, expense, attention, and lost opportunities, so all injustices cannot be
remedied." Galanter, supra note 2, at I11.
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Tort law has been the traditional avenue to obtain remedies in
these kinds of cases." As Adam Zimmerman notes, "[F]or years,
private lawsuits in the United States have been the primary tool to
ensure people pay damages to those they harm."94 Similarly, Judge
Weinstein notes that "[t]he subject of torts is crucial in providing
'for' the people because they should be able to use the law in order to
be compensated for their private injuries.""
Of course, slavery is multiple orders of magnitude more serious
than the minor violations that we expect society to address. As such,
it seems all the more unacceptable not to address it. Weinstein
elaborates further that "the tort model provides an effective
democratic and egalitarian means for protecting victims and ensuring
that their injuries are properly compensated."9 6 It protects "'the
default norm that the civil justice system will provide a remedy for
every wrong."' 97
Terms like "civil justice" and "civil recourse" are used to
describe a system or process of access to justice. Zimmerman notes
that "corrective justice and civil recourse are distinct concepts, but
both have been used to describe values that underlie access to private
civil litigation . .. both terms refer to an interpersonal form of justice
that, in turn, requires a wrongdoer to repair damages to a particular
person through a public process."" That is, suggests Zimmerman,
93. "In our legal system, redressing private wrongs has tended to be the business of tort
law . . . ." Goldberg, supra note 90, at 524; see also Saito, supra note 90, at 287 (arguing that the
"core function of movements for redress" is the "bringing to light of historical facts and their
human consequences").
More pessimistic observers have suggested that tort did not develop as a system to
compensate victims, but as an industry subsidy. Joyce Sterling & Nancy Reichman, The Cultural
Agenda of Tort Litigation: Constructing Responsibility in the Rocky Mountain Frontier, in FAULT
LINES 287, 287 (David M. Engel & Michael McCann eds., 2009) (discussing the literature on the
history and development of tort law). Obviously a tort system still focused on that purpose would
be unhelpful for slave claims.
94. Adam Zimmerman, Distributing Justice, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming May 2011);
see also Goldberg, supra note 90, at 541-49 (discussing the history of tort law in providing
redress for private harm); Jack B. Weinstein, Compensation for Mass Private Delicts: Evolving
Roles of Administrative, Criminal, and Tort Law, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 947, 954 (2001) (noting
that the function of tort law is "the compensation of victims and deterrence of future bad acts").
95. Weinstein, supra note 89, at 166.
96. Weinstein, supra note 94, at 969.
97. Id at 981 (quoting John C. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Third Restatement
and the Place ofDuty in Negligence, 54 VAND. L. REV. 657, 723 (2001)).
98. Zimmerman, supra note 94 (manuscript at 10-11). See generally Deborah R. Hensler,
Money Talks: Searching for Justice Through Compensation for Personal Injury and Death, 53
DEPAUL L. REv. 417, 422 (2003) (discussing which types of losses deserve mere compensation
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"they force a specific wrongdoer to restore victims' specific losses,
resulting from a specific wrongful act through an individualized, but
otherwise public, forum."" Jason Solomon suggests that "the
characteristics of civil justice might promote something called 'equal
accountability.' When we evaluate how well the civil justice system
works by looking at whether there are injuries that go unremedied,
accountability (along with more familiar metrics like compensation
and deterrence) ought be a primary metric that we use." 100 As Marc
Galanter notes, both injury and remedy are bound up with our
theories of justice and what wholeness means. "0
Ultimately each of these theories is based on the intuition that it
is morally unacceptable not to address harms of this magnitude. It is
wrong to expect that victims will let the harms go unaddressed or
simply "lump it" and absorb the harm themselves. 102
Furthermore, the potential lapse in justice relates the harm to the
rule of law. As various writers have suggested, reparations are an
important step in restoring confidence in the rule of law. This is not
unlike insights from other areas of tort law. For instance, David
Engel notes in interviews with villagers that one common perception
of harm and restitution is the idea of repairing the social fabric-that
society itself demands a remedy for some harms. 103
Failure to respond, on the other hand, lets a major moral wrong
go unredressed. As Roy Brooks notes, "When a government commits
an atrocity against an innocent people, it has, at the very least, a
moral obligation to apologize and to make that apology believable by
and from which the law should "exact retribution from harmdoers"); Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil
Recourse, Not Corrective Justice, 91 GEO. L.J. 695, 733-53 (2003) (offering a theory of civil
recourse in place of a theory of corrective justice).
99. Zimmerman, supra note 94 (manuscript at 10-11).
100. Jason M. Solomon, What Is Civil Justice?, 44 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 317, 337 (2010). This is
similar in some ways to Don Braman's approach, which is also based on the idea of
accountability. Donald Braman, Punishment and Accountability: Understanding and Reforming
Criminal Sanctions in America, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1143, 1147 (2006).
101. Marc Galanter, The Dialectic ofInjury and Remedy, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1,1 (2010).
102. See David M. Engel, Lumping as Default in Tort Cases: The Cultural Interpretation of
Injury and Causation, 44 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 33, 36 n.12 (2010).
103. See id at 25 in manuscript. See generally ROSALEE A. CLAWSON & ERIC N.
WALTENBURG, LEGACY AND LEGITIMACY: BLACK AMERICANS AND THE SUPREME COURT 3-5
(2008) (discussing how legitimacy can maintain the effectiveness of a political system); TOM R.
TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW: PROCEDURAL JUSTICE, LEGITIMACY, AND COMPLIANCE
19-68 (2006) (noting that justice creates legitimacy, which leads to buy-in and voluntary
cooperation with laws).
194
TOO BIG TO REMEDY?
doing something tangible called 'a reparation."' " Further, "[t]he
perpetrator's duty to atone for a past atrocity is a moral
imperative .... So long as the perpetrator or its successor-in-interest
is alive, the atrocity's moral stain does not perish with the
victims." "
Tort law is not designed only to address minor violations.
Instead, it includes potential avenues for relief for various kinds of
massive harms. For instance, class action cases are designed to
provide some level of restitution for large numbers of people who
have been injured by another party's bad actions. 10' These cases
often result in some sort of mass distribution. Zimmerman notes that
"large settlements hold defendants accountable for wide and diffuse
harms that are too costly to be prosecuted through individual
litigation. Class action settlements, at least theoretically, serve an
important democratic function, allowing groups of individuals to
collectively petition and redress widespread harm." "
Natsu Taylor Saito suggests that "[t]he basic principles we take
for granted in everyday instances of legal analysis, if they have any
legitimacy, should be equally applicable to large cases." ' That is,
the legal system should be able to accommodate even large cases.
Indeed, not only would one expect the same rules to apply to these
cases, but a contrary policy of not applying them would be seriously
problematic. Saito notes that "it raises questions about the legitimacy
of the entire legal project, for a system capable of providing remedies
only for minor violations of law, but not massive wrongs, promotes
neither justice nor the rule of law." 10' If the law can only address
104. BROOKS, supra note 9, at ix.
105. Id. at 143, 145.
106. Weinstein, supra note 96, at 953-54.
107. Zimmerman, supra note 94 (manuscript at 9); see also Judith Resnik et al., Individuals
Within the Aggregate: Relationships, Representation, and Fees, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 296, 382
(1996) ("[C]ourts offer. . . opportunitites for public participation. . . ."; Weinstein, supra note 94,
at 953 (describing class-action lawsuits as a method involving plaintiffs that may otherwise have
not sought a remedy). As Judge Weinstein notes, "In the past century tort law has expanded its
primary role to compensate." Weinstein, supra note 94, at 959. Tort law has traditionally had
additional punitive functions as well. See id at 954. See generally Kaimipono David Wenger &
David A. Hoffman, Nullificatory Juries, 2003 WISC. L. REV. 1115, 1120-25 (2003).
108. Saito, supra note 90, at 282. Those basic principles are: "Was there a right or a duty?
Was it violated and, if so, who is responsible? What damage accrued as a result? How can the
wrong be rectified?" Id. at 282-83.
109. Id. at 282; see also ELAZAR BARKAN, THE GUILT OF NATIONS, RESTITUTION AND
NEGOTIATING HISTORICAL INJUSTICES 283-95 (2000) (discussing reparations for slavery);
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minor scrapes and bruises, what good is it? Thus, one might
reasonably expect a system of corrective justice under the rule of law
to have some remedy in place for a set of egregious wrongs like
slavery. "o
Yet, reparations claims have already been denied for well over a
century. Despite repeated attempts to secure redress over the past
150 years,"' neither courts nor legislatures have ever made
restitution in any meaningful way. Westley writes of the reparations
project:
If there is a substantive view of oppression embedded in the
claim for slavery reparations, it is that state-sponsored
transgenerational private and public expropriation of labor
and wealth accumulation potential through force and
violence is unjust, that those who suffer such a fate deserve
material and symbolic redress from perpetrators, and that
the obligation of corporate or government wrongdoers to
make redress is not extinguished so long as they continue to
exist. 112
Thus, very good arguments can be made to show that restitution
claims should not be denied. Given these arguments, repeated court
and legislative punting is outrageous. The Black community is
justified in feeling moral indignation about the failure to address a
longstanding harm. The law has figured out ways to address other
harms, so why not this one?
B. Problems with Granting Restitution
On the other hand, the Slave Descendants court is right that
reparations cases are very complicated and raise difficult legal issues.
For a variety of reasons, courts are not well situated to address
classic tort or unjust enrichment claims for slavery reparations.
MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY AFTER
GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE 25-26 (1998) (noting the necessity of a legal proceeding in
responding to atrocity, in order to restore the rule of law).
110. See Wenger, supra note 8, at 238-41.
111. See Wenger, supra note 11, at 4-11 (discussing the history of reparations claims).
112. Robert Westley, Reparations and Symbiosis: Reclaiming the Remedial Focus, 71 UMKC
L. REV. 419, 429 (2002). Further, "[a]gainst the proper defendants, the idea of some kind of legal
action designed to punish and to secure compensation seems not only sensible, but also
compelling." Sebok, supra note 4, at 1417.
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Courts in the private law context traditionally focus on private
actions such as tort and contract claims. A variety of requirements in
those contexts-such as tort law's causation rules-do not map well
onto reparations claims. This is a problem that advocates have
known about for some time. For instance, Mari Matsuda challenges
conventional understandings of causation in the reparations
context. "' Matsuda argues that reparations could be achieved only if
the law bypassed traditional ideas of proximate causation and
individual connection between wrongdoer and victim, in favor of "an
expanded version of liberal legalism" based on "new connections
between victims and perpetrators." 114 Similarly, in a prior article, I
note that reparations claims do not fit well with traditional tort
theories of causation because they suffer from attenuation problems
relating to victims, wrongdoers, and actions: "[I]t is not an
overstatement to say that no case that suffered from all three kinds of
attenuation has successfully proceeded to a successful resolution
through trial or settlement. This is a dire diagnosis for
reparations." "
Reparations claims are also a poor fit with some tort views of
justice. Tort claims often rely on the concept of corrective justice,
which is designed to make whole parties that have been wronged.
Corrective justice attempts to put people in the position they would
have been in if the wrongful act had not occurred. 116 Corrective
justice ideas in reparations are backward-looking and would require
society to compensate for harms suffered by Blacks. "
On the surface, this approach would seem to be a good fit. After
all, reparations claims often are framed using corrective ideas.
Robinson famously writes that reparations should be viewed as a
113. Matsuda, supra note 51, at 381-83. Brophy calls this article "the fountainhead of
academic writing on reparations." BROPHY, supra note 4, at 278.
114. Matsuda, supra note 51, at 374.
115. Wenger, supra note 39, at 305 (emphasis omitted).
116. See generally ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 61-75 (1995) (discussing
differences between corrective and distributive justice ideas); Stephen Perry, On the Relationship
Between Corrective and Distributive Justice, in 4 OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 237
(Jeremy Horder ed., 2000) (same); Peter Benson, The Basis of Corrective Justice and Its Relation
to Distributive Justice, 77 IOWA L. REV. 515, 515-30 (1992) (same).
117. See Kim Forde-Mazrui, Taking Conservatives Seriously: A Moral Justification for
Affirmative Action and Reparations, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 683, 685, 707-09 (2004); Lyons, supra
note 17, at 1375-79.
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payment due on a debt. "' This framing is simple and suggests clear
liability.
However, the corrective approach does not fit well with
reparations claims for a number of reasons. Corrective justice
typically demands a close link between victim and accused-exactly
the characteristic reparations claims lack. This means that corrective
justice is not always a good fit for reparations. Robinson's debt
framework has been criticized precisely because it does not capture
the complexity of the variety of harms claimed in reparations or the
causal links involved. 119
There are other concerns with a corrective justice framework.
Corrective justice seeks to put people in the position they would be
in if the wrong had not occurred. However, there are tricky
theoretical questions as to how to treat that concept in the case of
slavery. 120 True compensation for these kinds of harms is impossible
because the value of the damage done is incalculable. As I note in
another article, "[r]eparations are always dealing in the realm of
fundamentally inadequate responses because money cannot truly
compensate victims . .. [r]ather, reparations for mass harm will
almost always be limited to ultimately symbolic gestures of
acknowledgement and regret." 121 Similarly, Martha Minow notes that
"the actual effects of the reparations law[] illustrate the symbolic
significance of official acknowledgement of wrongdoing," rather
than being compensatory in nature. 122 However this does not mean
that claims should remain unpaid. Martha Chamallas notes that
"[a]lthough some legitimately worry about the commodification of
118. ROBINSON, supra note 34, at 8-10.
119. This argument also fails to address the protection that law gives debtors.
120. BROPHY, supra note 4, at 7-8.
121. Kaimipono David Wenger, Apology Lite: Truths, Doubts, and Reconciliations in the
Senate's Guarded Apology for Slavery, 42 CONN. L. REV. CONNTEMPLATIONS 1, 6 (2009),
http://connecticutlawreview.org/documents/Wenger-FINALforonline.pdf
122. MINow, supra note 109, at 100 ("The point of these payments was not to make up for
the loss of home, business, opportunity, and standing in the community which these people had
suffered." (quoting Jeremy Waldron, Superseding Historic Injustice, 103 ETHICS 4 (1992))).
Another scholar notes that "there has never been 'adequate' compensation for nontangible ...
losses." BARKAN, supra note 109, at 290. And Matsuda notes that restitution is important even if
it is inexact: "Exactitude is less important than other social goals of the law. Better a windfall to
non-victims than to wrongdoers; better rough justice than no justice at all." Matsuda, supra note
51, at 385-87. See generally Dayna Nadine Scott, Body Polluted: Questions of Scale, Gender and
Remedy, 44 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 297 (2010) (discussing remedy options in cases where no
compensation is possible).
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intangible losses, in my view, the only thing worse than having one's
pain reduced to money is having one's pain reduced to very little
money." 123
Reparations arguments draw on distributive justice theory as
well. 124 Distributive justice focuses on achieving fair distribution of
resources. 125 This goal matches many of the forward-looking goals of
some conceptions of reparations and also avoids some of the
conceptual difficulties of reparations based on corrective justice.
However, distributive justice ideas do not always fit particularly
well with the tort system, which has historically reflected a
corrective justice approach in many cases. 126 Distributive justice
remedies are more difficult to receive through the judiciary and are
often legislated instead. 127
Tort law's reliance on corrective justice should not be
overstated; it is also true that, to some degree, "both corrective and
distributive justice ideals, including a concern for group equality, can
be found in tort law. . 128 But distributive justice ideas most often
123. Martha Chamallas, Civil Rights in Ordinary Tort Cases: Race, Gender, and the
Calculation ofEconomic Loss, 38 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 1435, 1437-38 (2005).
124. See Keith N. Hylton, A Framework for Reparations Claims, 24 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J.
31, 32 (2004) ("They reflect two distinct and in some ways conflicting policies behind reparations
litigation. One approach is driven in large part by social welfare and distributional goals. The
other approach is based on a desire to correct historical injustices; simply to 'do justice."');
Matsuda, supra note 51, at 375-80. But see Katrina M. Wyman, Is There a Moral Justification for
Redressing Historical Injustices?, 61 VAND. L. REv. 127 (2008) (arguing that distributive justice
does not provide a moral basis for reparations).
125. See Hylton, supra note 124, at 33 ("At the heart of the FleetBoston [reparations] suit is a
belief that reparations litigation will compensate or correct for years and years of inattention, or
insufficient attention, to the welfare of African Americans."). This is similar to the redistributive
goal of the tobacco class action litigation. Id.; see also BROPHY, supra note 4, at 8; Calvin
Massey, Some Thoughts on the Law and Politics of Reparations for Slavery, 24 B.C. THIRD
WORLD L.J. 157, 158-67 (2004) (discussing the two different approaches).
126. See Forde-Mazrui, supra note 117, at 685, 707-09; Lyons, supra note 17, at 1375-78.
127. Cf Richard A. Epstein, The Case Against Black Reparations, 84 B.U. L. REv. 1177,
1186 (2004) ("[W]hy think of the claim as one for reparations when the program looks far more
like some legislative initiative that does not have to observe the standard constraints of corrective
justice, but simply has to command sufficient political support to pass."). One interesting aspect
of reparations lawsuits is their use of corrective justice tools, the tort system, to try to create the
pressure to ultimately lead to a remedy from the legislature, which would be a distributive justice
remedy. Of course, distributive justice may not be a perfect fit either. As Galanter notes,
"Distributive justice is forward looking, but cool, reflective, detached; corrective justice is warm
but retrospective, emphasizing continuity and identity . . . ." Galanter, supra note 2, at 121.
128. Chamallas, supra note 123, at 1457.
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manifest in settlement. 129 And reparations claims, which would
benefit from a distributive justice approach, are nowhere near
settlement. "o A settlement would require more political will than
exists. And even if advocates took different strategic approaches, the
basic problem remains. Reparations claims neither fit well into the
court system, nor fit well into corrective justice theories. "'
Other tort theories are also unhelpful. For instance, many
scholars have suggested that tort law should promote economic
efficiency. 132 However, it is not clear that reparations would be an
efficient use of resources. And even if reparations claims were
clearly economically efficient, tying them to economic outcomes
threatens to commodify the harm of slavery in problematic ways. "
It is also not clear that reparations would be justified for
deterrence reasons. 134 Reparations advocates disagree on whether
reparations would have deterrent value. Matsuda suggests that
reparations would give at least some deterrent effect. "' Other
129. As Zimmerman notes, "[C]lass action settlements increasingly straddle the line between
tort and public benefit compensation" in part because they "seek rules that further distributive
justice among many people who suffer many different kinds of loss, and stem[] from many,
sometimes indistinguishable, causes." Zimmerman, supra note 94 (manuscript at 10); see also
TSACHI KEREN-PAZ, TORTS, EQUALITARIANISM AND DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 8 (2007)
(discussing distributive justice in tort law).
130. In addition, the moral claims of reparations may be a bad fit for the pragmatic bargaining
of the settlement table. Cf Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1084-85
(1984) (describing settlements as the "products of a bargain between the parties rather than of a
trial and an independent judicial judgment").
131. For instance, as Brophy notes, it is unclear "whether tort law would provide
compensation for harm to subsequent generations" after the harm occurred. BROPHY, supra note
4, at 108; see also Matsuda, supra note 51, at 374-85 (discussing ways to establish the proximate
causal connection between the past wrong and present claim despite a generational time gap).
132. See MARTHA CHAMALLAS & JENNIFER B. WRIGGTNS, THE MEASURE OF INJURY: RACE,
GENDER, AND TORT LAW 64 (2010) (discussing prominent tort scholars' focus on law and
economics).
133. See Sebok, supra note 4, at 1426-27 (explaining how focusing on the value of slave
labor "commodifies" the wrongs of slavery); Wenger, supra note 22, at 204-05 (discussing the
danger of commodification).
134. See generally Weinstein, supra note 94, at 954 (discussing the role of deterrence in tort
law).
135. See Matsuda, supra note 51, at 383-84 ("Deterrence is particularly advanced by
reparations doctrine. The very process of determining the validity of claims will force collective
examination of the historical record. The discovery and acknowledgement of past wrongs will
educate us, and help us to avoid repeating the same errors. Acknowledging and paying for the
wrong of the World War II relocation, for example, would help us analyze current proposals for
preventive detention. Victim-consciousness, including an acute awareness of threats to freedom,
could become part of mainstream consciousness.").
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scholars are less sure. 136 Slavery is sufficiently removed in time, and
an anti-slavery norm sufficiently engrained, that reparations would
likely have little deterrent effect.
Finally, it is not clear that tort law or unjust enrichment has the
moral heft to handle reparations claims. Writing about the lack of
moral dimension in unjust enrichment, Anthony Sebok notes that
unjust enrichment provides "an impoverished understanding" of
reparations claims because it merely turns them into claims that
slaves were not paid. '" Similarly, Brooks writes with regards to tort
claims that "[t]he final problem with the tort model" is "its moral
deficiency.... [T]he tort model clouds the black redress movement's
identity with international human rights movements." 138 Thus, the fit
may frustrate not just courts but reparations advocates as well.
The Slave Descendants court, like many other opponents of tort
reparations, is both right and wrong. It is correct that the tort system
does not fit well with reparations claims in many ways. It is also true,
however, that lack of redress is unacceptable. The result is a paradox
of sorts-the reparations dilemma. Tort compensation is a poor fit,
but nonremedy is an outrage. This dilemma frames the following
discussion.
IV. MASS HARM AND THE LIMITS OF JUDICIAL REMEDIES
Slavery and Jim Crow, then, illustrate some of the difficult
questions that arise in mass restitution cases. Some reparative action
is needed in the case of slavery and Jim Crow; the community has
136. Ken Cooper-Stephenson, Theoretical Underpinnings for Reparations: A Constitutional
Tort Perspective, 22 WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS JUST. 3, 8-10 (2003) (discussing reparations' lack of
deterrent effect on future government behavior); see Wyman, supra note 124, (arguing that
reparations are not justified under theories of deterrence).
137. Sebok, supra note 41, at 52-53. The unjust enrichment concept was introduced for
pragmatic reasons. See Sebok, supra note 4, at 1414-16 (discussing how states turned to an unjust
enrichment claim in tobacco litigation when other strategies failed); see also BROPHY, supra note
4, at 109-14.
Unjust enrichment offers only a small potential recovery, for price of services, while
adding additional conceptual problems: it undercuts the moral force of reparations claims, and it
is unlikely to fully compensate for harm. This is because of a particular conceptual disconnect-
as Brophy notes, in reparations cases, "[h]arm almost always is greater than benefit"-meaning
that unjust enrichment claims, unlike tort claims, will typically undercompensate. Unjust
enrichment is also a sort of conceptual cul-de-sac, with none of the moral force of other claims.
See BROPHY, supra note 4, at 104; Sebok, supra note 4, at 1426-30, 1440-42; Wenger, supra
note 39, at 285 n.25.
138. BROOKS, supra note 9, at 140.
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sustained severe moral harm, and the longstanding lack of response
only reinscribes injury. However, traditional tort approaches are
inadequate. Of course, individual compensation for mass injustices is
always difficult to calculate and administer. Slavery, as a "super-
wrong," puts the normal concerns of mass compensation into sharp
relief and adds a whole new set of unique concerns for courts,
legislators, and theorists. 139 Ultimately, the breakdown of the judicial
approach in reparations cases helps to illustrate some of the limits of
courts.
Court limits are not the sole explanation for the failure of
reparations lawsuits. Denial of claims stems from a variety of factors.
Racism and related biases have been involved in several stages of the
process. However, the rejection of claims by the Slave Descendants
and Alexander courts is ultimately about more than just the particular
harms at issue in those cases or the underlying race issues. It also
makes a statement about the role of courts. In the end, courts are not
situated to address damages without causation. It is not what we
expect courts to do. The indirect effect of this type of litigation is to
show the limits of law.
Slavery and Jim Crow illustrate the problem of injury without
remedy, the topic of this symposium. This problem challenges our
notions of how we address wrong in society. If a wrong cannot be
addressed by courts, how should it be addressed? And in particular,
how should we treat harms that are focused on marginalized
minorities-the groups who are not well represented in the
democratic process and who disproportionately rely on courts for
protection? This part discusses ways that the existing framing of tort
questions reflects and reinforces certain societal values.
A. Mass Restitution and Its Limits
One initial note is that tools do exist for addressing some
massive harms. Courts and legislatures have addressed large harms
multiple times in the past. 140 In the process of addressing such harms,
139. See Galanter, supra note 2, at 109 ("[T]he claim for reparations for American slavery ...
raises so abundantly the perplexities of righting old wrongs.").
140. See BROPHY, supra note 4, at 30-31 (listing instances of reparations); cf Zimmerman,
supra note 94 (manuscript at 16) (citations omitted) ("In the early 1800s, Congress passed laws
designed to compensate victims of natural disasters, the Revolutionary War, and other
calamities.").
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court roles have been fluid, and judges have sometimes engaged in
flexible "judging for the situation" to address mass harms with novel
tools. 141
We see one instance of novel legal approaches in In re "Agent
Orange" Products Liability Litigationl42 in which Judge Weinstein
adopted a number of novel tactics to bridge the gap. 14 "To address a
complex problem of underdetermination, Judge Weinstein applied
statistical causation using a type of proportional liability in allocating
damages." '" Statistical, pro rata distribution of damages was used
because of the problem of indeterminate defendants and
indeterminate plaintiffs. 145 Recognizing the relative novelty of this
approach, the judge wrote: "We are in a different world of proof than
that of the archetypical smoking gun. We must make the best
estimates of probability that we can using the help of experts such as
statisticians and our own common sense and experience with the real
universe." 146
Similarly, some class action cases have resulted in compensation
to a community through use of a "fluid recovery" model or through
141. See Martha Minow, Judge for the Situation: Judge Jack Weinstein, Creator of
Temporary Administrative Agencies, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 2010, 2019-21 (1997) (discussing
Judge Weinstein's use of "judging for the situation").
142. 597 F. Supp. 740 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
143. Minow, supra note 141, at 2013-14.
144. Wenger, supra note 39, at 313; see In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp.
740, 836-37 (E.D.N.Y. 1984). See generally PETER H. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL 26,
30, 271-72 (1986) (describing trial and resolution, including process of arriving at settlement).
145. In re "Agent Orange," 597 F. Supp. at 840-43. The court later wrote that causation
could not be established to allow liability. See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F.
Supp. 1223, 1229 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (granting summary judgment to defendants against plaintiffs
who had opted out of certified class, since plaintiffs could not show a "causal link between
exposure to Agent Orange and the various diseases from which they are allegedly suffering"),
affd, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987); id. at 1267 (also granting summary judgment against an opt-
out plaintiff).
146. In re "Agent Orange," 597 F. Supp. at 838; see also In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos
Litig., 52 F.3d 1124, 1131 (2d Cir. 1995) ("Causation in toxic torts normally comprises two
separate inquiries: whether the epidemiological or other scientific evidence establishes a causal
link between c (asbestos exposure) and d (colon cancer), and whether plaintiff is within the class
of persons to which inferences from the general causation evidence should be applied."); David
Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public Law" Vision of the Tort
System, 97 HARv. L. REV. 849, 859-60 (1984) (advocating proportional liability for defendants
"in proportion to the probability of causation [of harm]" to the plaintiff class members). But cf
Richard W. Wright, Causation in Tort Law, 73 CALIF. L. REv. 1735, 1822-23 (1985) (arguing
that mere statistics, even when based on causal generalizations, cannot adequately show legal
causation).
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other approaches distinct from individual checks. 147 For instance,
courts have used the cy pres power in a variety of mass restitution
settings in the past. 148 Judge Weinstein notes that "[m]any mass tort
resolutions have moved away from the traditional courtroom
individual remedies, and have instead set up aggregated settlements,
compensation-administrative plans, and insurance-type installment
payment programs supervised by the courts." 149
Even more creative remedies are an option. For instance, there
are various hybrid litigation models. Judge Weinstein and others
have addressed the possibility of administrative agency-like actions.
In a 2001 article, Judge Weinstein discussed how administrative,
civil, and criminal law could work in concert to provide responses
for some mass private harms. 15o At its most complicated, the process
could involve political action, judicial action, and administrative
hearings, all linked together. This sort of joint action took place with
the 9/11 Victim Compensation Fund, under the direction of Special
Master Kenneth Feinberg. '
In theory, at least, reparations could similarly be addressed by a
broad application of legal theories. 152 Many advocates have
suggested this sort of approach. For instance, I have suggested that
reparations claims could be analyzed under statistical causation
models, such as those used in mass restitution cases brought by
147. See Weinstein, supra note 94, at 979-80 ("Private actions by individuals or private
nongovernmental groups to obtain remedies for the population generally against abuses in
prisons, mental institutions, schools, toxic dumps, or the like in this category."). There are
criticisms of flexible tort models. For instance, some critics have pointed out potential problems
in the mass tort model, including the danger that verdicts will be outliers, not representative of
community beliefs, or otherwise problematic. See, e.g., Bryon Stier, Jackpot Justice: Verdict
Variability and the Mass Tort Class Action, 80 TEMP. L. REV. 1013, 1018, 1028-30 (2007).
However, additional procedural protections may be able to lessen these problems. Weinstein,
supra note 94, at 979-80.
148. Cf JACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS TORT LITIGATION 132-36
(1995) (discussing historical mass tort action doctrines).
149. Weinstein, supra note 94, at 971.
150. Id. at 948-56.
151. See generally KENNETH R. FEINBERG, WHAT IS LIFE WORTH?: THE INSIDE STORY OF
THE 9/11 FUND AND ITS EFFORT TO COMPENSATE THE VICTIMS OF SEPTEMBER 11TH 16-190
(2005) (discussing the history and functioning of the 9/11 Victim Compensation Fund).
152. Alternatively, some observers have suggested that reparations claims may work as a type
of "rough justice." See generally Adrian Vermeule, Reparations as Rough Justice, 2-14 (Univ. of
Chi. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Grp., Paper No. 105, 2005), available at
http://www.law.uchicago.edulfiles/files/105.pdf.
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plaintiffs harmed by the drug diethylstilbestrol (DES). 153 Similarly,
reparations advocates have suggested that an expanded use of human
rights law could help claimants avoid statute of limitation
concerns. 154 Reparationists have also focused on derivative harms to
claimants. There are limited tort analogies, such as DES
granddaughters who have suffered real derivative harm.
But, in the current judicial climate, it is not clear that this will
ever happen. Courts are becoming more entrenched in conservative
legal positions and less willing to adopt novel approaches to legal
questions. '
The type of harm here does not seem particularly "torty." The
structure of tort law assumes and builds on certain ideas of harm.
The generational problem, in particular, is one that is difficult to
reconcile with current judicial approaches. In cases about Japanese
Americans, Holocaust slave labor, and other mass torts, courts have
been unwilling to go past the generation where the initial harm
occurred. Even exceptions like DES granddaughters are extremely
limited. Ultimately, even courts that are more receptive to novel
theories of law are still limited by the underlying rule of proximate
causation.
B. The Fluidity of Causation
As discussed above, issues of causation have proven fatal to
reparations claims. Causation is a basic element of tort claims.
However, as numerous scholars have noted, causation cannot always
be defined or determined. '" Any event will have infinite potential
causes, but only some of these will be recognized at law. People like
to create stories of causation with clear narrative arcs. But, causal
153. Wenger, supra note 39, at 313-15, 318-22. "DES was a drug commonly given to
pregnant woman over a period of time, and it ultimately proved to have deleterious effects on
many children of those women." Id. at 307. DES litigants "faced victim attenuation defenses,
since the daughters and granddaughters of women who took DES brought claims for harms done
to them." Id.
154. See Eric J. Miller, Reconceiving Reparations: Multiple Strategies in the Reparations
Debate, 24 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 45, 60-61 (2004).
155. See Wenger, supra note 39, at 306-07 (discussing the DES granddaughters analogy).
156. See Weinstein, supra note 89, at 34-37 & n.115 (discussing conservative shift in
Supreme Court jurisprudence).
157. See CHAMALLAS & WRIGGINS, supra note 132, at 120-28; H.L.A. HART & TONY
HONORE, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 1-3 (2d ed. 1985); Wex S. Malone, Ruminations on Cause-in-
Fact, 9 STAN. L. REv. 60, 88-89 (1956); Wenger, supra note 39, at 286-89.
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chains tend to be much more complex than the simple narratives that
people use. '8
The related concept of duty is also complex. William L. Prosser
and W. Page Keeton note:
The statement that there is or is not a duty begs the essential
question-whether the plaintiffs interests are entitled to
legal protection against the defendant's conduct . . . . It is a
shorthand statement of a conclusion, rather than an aid to
analysis in itself. . . . It should be recognized that 'duty' is
not sacrosanct in itself, but only an expression of the sum
total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to
say that the plaintiff is entitled to protection. 1'
It is no surprise then that, as Galanter notes, injury and remedy
form a sort of "moving frontier." 0 Not only are these frontiers
moving, they are also self-defined and fluid. Society has moved the
boundaries in the past. 161 In fact, injury as a concept may emerge
from the process of remedy. 162 Thus, the areas that are designated as
"not subject to remedy" reflect a particular set of societal values and
choices. When we say that reparations claims fail, we are reflecting
certain societal values.
And the complexities of causation can be used to downplay the
claims of less-favored groups. 6 Tort law routinely undervalues
harms to disadvantaged groups. For instance, scholars have pointed
out how tort law has historically undervalued harms to women,
tending to accord those damages less weight. " Chamallas notes that
"[h]idden race and gender bias in tort awards is also present in the
standards used to calculate economic harm." 16 There are several
ways that this occurs. For instance, courts may rely on gender- and
158. See generally MALCOLM GLADWELL, BLINK: THE POWER OF THINKING WITHOUT
THINKING (Back Bay Books 2007) (2005) (discussing tendencies to overattribute causation);
Michael B. Dorff, Confident Uncertainty, Excessive Compensation and the Obama Plan, 85 IND.
L.J. 491, 507-08 (2010).
159. KEETON, ET AL., supra note 50, at 357-58 (citations omitted).
160. Galanter, supra note 101, at 2.
161. Cases like Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954), have significantly altered our
understanding of the legal regime. See Ian Haney Lopez, Race and Colorblindness After
Hernandez and Brown, 25 CHICANO-LATINO L. REv. 61, 61-62 (2005).
162. See Galanter, supra note 101, at 3.
163. CHAMALLAS & WRIGGINS, supra note 132, at 119-53.
164. Chamallas, supra note 123, at 1437-38.
165. Id. at 1438.
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race-based wage tables in damage calculations. This approach leads
to systematic undervaluation of harms to minority groups, which are
underrepresented in higher-wage jobs. '66
One cause of this disparity among tort awards is overt bias.
Courts have a long history of reducing awards to Black claimants
simply because courts viewed the claims as less important, or
because the courts chose to apply stereotypes in determining the
amount of an award. 167
Minority groups have also been excluded by the flexibility of
tort doctrines, which allow legal actors to define some harms as
outside of the law's protection. 168 As Chamallas notes:
[C]ausation [is] a value-laden inquiry that cannot be
separated from considerations of social policy....
[A]ssessments of causation are influenced by the identity of
the injured parties and that causal attribution is a dynamic
process, the product of cultural as well as intellectual
developments. Gender ideology may affect which injuries
are regarded as "remote" and which are classified as
"proximate." The core notion of "injury" also is being
mined for its cultural and ideological dimensions. . . . [New
critiques of harms] disproportionately inflicted upon
women and racial minorities have the potential to generate
a broader critical discussion about the inadequacy of
traditionally recognized categories of legal injuries. 6
166. Id. at 1438-40.
167. Id. at 1440-42; see also Jennifer B. Wriggins, Damages in Tort Litigation: Thoughts on
Race and Remedies, 1865-2007, 27 REV. LITIG. 37, 48, 50-51 (2007) (discussing a 1909 case
where the jury awarded a Black man who had been falsely accused of stealing with the sum of
$2,500; but the trial judge reduced the award to $300, stating that "[i]n one sense, a colored man
is just as good as a white man, for the law says he is, but he has not the same amount of injury
under all circumstances that a white man would have").
168. A variety of legal and societal barriers serve to block many claims. See generally John
Nockleby, Faces of the Tort Pyramid: Compensation, Regulation, and the Profession, in AN
UNFINISHED PROJECT: LAW AND THE POSSIBILITY OF JUSTICE (Scott Cummings ed., 2010)
[hereinafter Nockleby, Faces] (discussing how tort rules, economics, and societal norms
effectively filter claims, creating a "pyramid" where only some claims will be valued); see also
John Nockleby, Access to Justice: It's Not for Everyone, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 859, 860 (2009)
[hereinafter Nockleby, Access] (discussing symposium papers that show that "the American legal
system does not, in fact, provide 'access' to everyone").
169. Martha Chamallas, Questioning the Use ofRace-Specific and Gender-Specific Economic
Data in Tort Litigation: A Constitutional Argument, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 73, 74-75 (1994).
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Chamallas elaborates elsewhere in her work that "[w]hen seemingly
neutral tort rules replicate an unequal status quo, it becomes that
much more difficult for disadvantaged social groups to bring about
social change." 1o This is because "rules created within a
predominately white, male-dominated system often fail to take into
account the differing experiences of more marginalized social groups
in society." "'
For instance, tort law focuses on a narrow definition of injury,
which privileges the claims of dominant groups. As Chamallas notes,
feminist scholars have written about how "tort law tends not to see
the social dimension of an injury and to conceptualize harm
simplistically and dichotomously." 172 Law is designed with certain
assumptions. The limits society places on legal tools reflect the
assumptions and privileges of the majority. Tort law is designed to
protect individuals against specific deprivations. The tort system
does not contemplate some types of mass harm because the parties in
power-those who create the rules of tort law-do not face those
types of harm.
In addition, tort law's focus on corrective justice and
preservation of the status quo is an approach that reinforces the
dominant groups while continuing to disadvantage marginalized
groups. Chamallas notes that,
As Canadian scholar Elizabeth Adjin-Tettey has pointed
out, to insist that distributional concerns have no place in
tort law presupposes that the status quo is fair and equitable
and deserves to be replicated. In criticizing such a narrow
corrective justice position, she argues that "corrective
justice is only aimed at formal equality. It does not question
the justice of the status quo or the relative positions of the
parties." "
C. Too Big to Remedy
Another idea, which comes up sometimes in tort law, is that
some harms may simply be too big to remedy. In the famous case of
170. Chamallas, supra note 123, at 1458.
171. Chamallas, supra note 169, at 73.
172. Chamallas, supra note 123, at 1437 (discussing the work of Catherine MacKinnon).
173. Id. at 1457-58.
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Strauss v. Belle Realty Co., 174 the court used precisely this logic to
dismiss a tort claim. Strauss involved a 1977 blackout caused by a
utility company's gross negligence. As the court noted, "a failure of
defendant Consolidated Edison's power system left most of New
York City in darkness," 1" and the elderly plaintiff was harmed in a
foreseeable way, slipping and falling in the dark and sustaining
injuries. 171
However, the court held that public policy proscribed any
finding of liability: "[I]n the case of a blackout of a metropolis of
several million residents and visitors, each in some manner
necessarily affected by a 25-hour power failure, liability for injuries
in a building's common areas should, as a matter of public policy, be
limited by the contractual relationship." 117 Why was this? The court
elaborated:
[I]t is still the responsibility of courts, in fixing the orbit of
duty, "to limit the legal consequences of wrongs to a
controllable degree," and to protect against crushing
exposure to liability. "In fixing the bounds of that duty, not
only logic and science, but policy play an important role."
The courts' definition of an orbit of duty based on public
policy may at times result in the exclusion of some who
might otherwise have recovered for losses or injuries if
traditional tort principles had been applied. "
As the court further clarified, the potential universe of plaintiffs
harmed by a system-wide power failure included tenants, guests,
invitees, store customers, and many others. 179 Given the broad scope
of potential claimants, "permitting recovery to those in plaintiffs
circumstances would . . . violate the court's responsibility to define
an orbit of duty that places controllable limits on liability." 1' Since
liability could be enormous and sui generis, it was acceptable to limit
174. 482 N.E.2d 34, 36 (N.Y. 1985).
175. Id. at 35.
176. Id. at 36.
177. Id. at 35.
178. Id at 36 (citations omitted).
179. Id. at 38.
180. Id
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the liability. 1"' Consolidated Edison's actions had created a harm that
was too big to remedy.
Other cases have held that liability should be limited in this kind
of way so as to avoid the specter of unlimited liability in cases where
the harm might be too big to remedy. For instance, in Waters v. New
York City Housing Authority, 182 the court denied a tort recovery
against a building owner where a young woman was accosted on the
street, forced into an unlocked area of the building, and raped. 18 The
court wrote that if the victim had been a tenant, she would have had a
claim against the negligent building owners. However, because she
was not a tenant, the building owners owed her no duty. 184 To
expand the owners' duty to include her would open the floodgates of
potential liability: "Another significant factor is the virtually limitless
liability to which defendant and other landowners would be exposed
if their legal obligations were extended to plaintiff and to all others in
her position." 1
Similarly, in Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 1"6 the court
reasoned that gun manufacturers may have caused a foreseeable
harm. The manufacturers were not liable, though, because they did
not have a practical way to stop third party harms. 18 Thus, once
again the potential size of the universe of claims suggested that the
court should limit liability: "This judicial resistance to the expansion
of duty grows out of practical concerns . .. about potentially limitless
liability." 18 This was again because of the sheer number of potential
claims: "The pool of possible plaintiffs is very large-potentially,
any of the thousands of victims of gun violence." 18 In effect, the
court narrowed what would otherwise be a duty to the world. In 532
181. Id. at 36.
182. 505 N.E.2d 922 (N.Y. 1987).
183. Id. at 922-23.
184. Id. at 925.
185. Id. at 924 (citation omitted); see also Jacqueline S. by Ludovina S. v. City of New York,
614 N.E.2d 723, 726 (N.Y. 1993) (Bellacosa, J., dissenting) (arguing that the ultimate effect of
the majority's denial of the landlord's motion for summary judgment, in a negligence action
brought by a tenant who had been sexually assaulted by an intruder, would be to render the
landlord "an unlimited insurer" against urban crime-an unwarranted result).
186. 750 N.E.2d 1055 (N.Y. 2001).
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Madison Avenue Gourmet Foods, Inc. v. Finlandia Center, Inc., 190
after defendants' negligent acts damaged business owners over
several blocks, the court similarly ruled that tort law precluded
"exposing defendants to unlimited liability to an indeterminate class
of persons." "' Similar arguments were used repeatedly during the
World Trade Center litigation. 192
In short, the argument draws on multiple strands of tort law. It is
ultimately an impracticability claim, an argument that aggregate
damages are simply too big to award. However, courts attach this
concept to the legal doctrine of duty. Because the damages would be
too large, there is no duty, and because there is no duty, the
defendant is not liable.
Similar impracticability arguments are often raised in the
context of slavery reparations. For instance, the Cato court wrote that
"the legislature, rather than the judiciary, is the appropriate forum for
this relief." 1 On the surface, this may seem to be simply a case of
judicial deference. However, the court was fully aware that the
legislature had no intention of addressing the issue. 194 In that case,
the court effectively threw up its hands and said, "[T]his is too big to
remedy." Similarly, the Slave Descendants court pointed to features
of slavery-passage of time, amount of people involved, and other
factors-as reasons for denying restitution. 195
Critics of reparations often make this argument as well. "6 For
instance, one conservative political group's report "The Case Against
Slave Reparations" contains repeated references to the size of the
claims. 19 It criticizes reparations proposals as "a massive
190. 750 N.E.2d 1097 (N.Y. 2001).
191. Id. at 1099, 1101 (N.Y. 2001).
192. Anthony J. Sebok, What's Law Got to Do with It? Designing Compensation Schemes in
the Shadow of the Tort System, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 501, 513-18 (2003) (discussing the Strauss
case in the context of the World Trade Center litigation).
193. Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1111 (9th Cir. 1995).
194. See Saito, supra note 90, at 295 (criticizing the courts' invocation of the political
question doctrine to avoid having to deal with politically sensitive questions, as exemplified by
the Ninth Circuit in Cato).
195. In re African-American Slave Descendants Litig., 471 F.3d 754, 754-60 (7th Cir. 2006).
196. See Gladys L. Knight, Reparations, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN RACE RIOTS 563
(Walter C. Rucker & James N. Upton eds., 2007) (noting that "other popular arguments include
the points that a reparations plan would be too expensive").
197. PETER FLAHERTY & JOHN CARLISLE, THE CASE AGAINST SLAVERY REPARATIONS 1, 5
(2004), available at http://www.nlpc.org/pdfs/FinalNLPCReparations.pdf; see also BARKAN,
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government program that would pay billions of taxpayer dollars." 198
It later notes that "demands for reparations reach into the trillions of
dollars" '9 and that the Slave Descendants lawsuit "puts the value of
slave labor at $1.4 trillion-almost as much as the federal
government collects in individual and corporate income taxes each
year."2 00 The authors suggest that no restitution is appropriate
because "[t]he potential for reparations inflation is infinite." 20 '
The impracticability argument may be framed in various ways.
One framing focuses on the potential disruptiveness of a remedy.
Saito notes that, under these views, "only political solutions are
viable" in reparations because of "overwhelming disruptions to the
status quo."202 Yet, using these sorts of reasons to argue against
reparations seems counterintuitive. Indeed, denying such a claim for
impracticability seems to reward bad behavior. It sends the message
that some harms are so great that no restitution is needed: "the
greater and more systemic the wrong, the less likely . .. [the]
remedy."203 That is, of course, upside-down reasoning.
Saito sets out in some detail why this view is wrong. He notes
that "[i]f legal remedies are available only when potential disruption
of existing relations of power or property rights are minimal, then the
inevitable result is that the most egregious of wrongs receive the
least legal or political redress."2 04 In such a case, "we run the risk of
allowing the most particularized articulations and mechanisms of
law-all of which are supposed to ensure the smooth functioning of
the rule of law, not its avoidance-to subvert the most significant
legal principles."20 5 And he notes that "each massive wrong that is
accepted as somehow inevitable, if unfortunate, or incapable of being
remedied, generates its own complications."206 This is certainly the
supra note 109, at 290 ("There seems to be an obsession among activists and critics with
estimating the magnitude of the anticipated restitution.").
198. Id. at i.
199. Id. at 1.
200. Id at 5.
201. Id. at 19.
202. Saito, supra note 90, at 284.
203. Id. at 295.
204. Id. at 300 (emphasis omitted).
205. Id. at 303.
206. Id. at 304.
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case with slavery, where plaintiffs bring claims this late because
racist courts and legislatures denied earlier attempts.207
Thus, both the requirement of a coherent justice system and the
need to avoid rewarding bad behavior strongly suggest that
reparations claims should not be rejected on the basis that the harm is
"too big to remedy."
D. Too Complex to Remedy?
A related impracticability argument draws on the idea that
reparations claims are simply too complex to remedy. One recent
example comes from Henry Louis Gates, Jr. who writes that a
traditional approach to reparations is insufficient because it does not
adequately consider the culpability of African tribes. Gates writes:
There are many thorny issues to resolve before we can
arrive at a judicious (if symbolic) gesture to match such a
sustained, heinous crime. Perhaps the most vexing is how to
parcel out blame to those directly involved in the capture
and sale of human beings for immense economic gain.
While we are all familiar with the role played by the
United States and the European colonial powers like
Britain, France, Holland, Portugal and Spain, there is very
little discussion of the role Africans themselves played. ...
Given this remarkably messy history, the problem with
reparations may not be so much whether they are a good
idea or deciding who would get them; the larger question
just might be from whom they would be extracted.208
This argument echoes other objections to reparations. 209 Gates's
article has been rightly criticized-because, for instance, it suggests
a false moral equivalence between the two groups. 21
207. BROPHY, supra note 4, at 130-31 (arguing that statutes of limitations should be tolled
because at the time the cause of action occurred, the courts were "effectively unavailable" due to
racism).
208. Henry Louis Gates, Jr., Op-Ed., Ending the Slavery Blame-Game, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22,
2010, at A27.
209. See, e.g., FLAHERTY & CARLISLE, supra note 197, at 20 (discussing African involvement
in the slave trade); David Horowitz, Unsavory Black Insinuations: A Reply to David Boyle, 105
W. VA. L. REv. 699, 706 (2003) (arguing that black Africans enslaved the vast majority of
slaves).
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First, as noted by many reparations scholars, this is a false
equivalency because: (1) African nations did not instigate the
transatlantic slave trade, (2) African nations did not reap most of the
profits from the slave trade, and (3) many African countries have
apologized for their participation. 211 I would add to that list that any
successor liability chain from African nations is also far less clear.
The United States is the very same legal entity that existed in 1800.
However, it is much less clear that any sort of chain of responsibility
passed from, say, Queen Njinga to Belgium's King Leopold (who
himself orchestrated one of the great genocides of the past
century) 2 12 and from there to the current governments of African
states.
In addition, even if there is some moral culpability that can be
attributed to current political entities in Africa, this does not
necessarily block reparations claims. Culpability of African
participants in slavery "would not," as Brooks notes, "absolve our
government of its own moral duty to apologize for its role in
slavery .... Each wrongdoer is responsible for its own
wrongdoing." 2 13
Gates's argument illustrates some of the reasons why a
straightforward corrective justice account is complicated in the case
of slavery. Slavery involved many culpable actors, in a wide variety
of roles. This makes a corrective justice story harder to tell. Gates's
argument focuses on that broad-scope complexity. It fits into the
category of similar statements that reparations claims are too
complex to remedy. Such objections broaden the scope of the
reparations discussion until it includes African tribes, the British, and
a dozen other participants-and of course someone always
210. Eric Foner, Letter to the Editor, Africa's Role in the U.S. Slave Trade, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 26, 2010, at A22; see also Kaimipono David Wenger, Reparations and Gates-keeping,
CONCURRING OPINIONS BLOG (Apr. 24, 2010, 10:10 PM), http://www.concurringopinions.com/
archives/2010/04/reparations-and-gates-keeping.html (arguing that Gates's arguments may have
been politically motivated).
211. See BROOKS, supra note 9, at 180; see also Feagin, supra note 9, at 52-53 (discussing
how the profitable enterprises around African and African-American slavery are part of the
reason the United States developed as a modem industrial nation).
212. See generally ADAM HOCHSCHILD, KING LEOPOLD'S GHOST: A STORY OF GREED,
TERROR, AND HEROISM IN COLONIAL AFRICA 225-34 (Houghton Mifflin 1999) (1998)
(discussing the history of genocide during Belgian rule in the Congo).
213. BROOKS, supra note 9, at 181 (emphasis omitted); see also BROPHY, supra note 4, at 79,
81-82.
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eventually brings up the Romans and Vandals. 214 The real
complexity of slavery is then used to justify hand-wringing about the
impossibility of redress.
These objections ignore the law's ability to routinely address
complex issues by focusing on the specifics of a case and ignoring
fanciful counterfactuals. Courts can analyze Palsgraf v. Long Island
Railroad Co.,215 for instance, without needing to inquire whether any
other package anywhere ever exploded on any other known train
platform. Courts simply examine the facts in the specific case to
determine whether there is liability. Political actors can enact 9/11
victim compensation without needing to bootstrap in every victim of
every plane hijacking in history; "' they rightly focus on one discrete
set of victims. 217
Reparations claims are similar. There is a clear moral case for
slavery reparations based on very clear actions (government and
private) of massive human rights violations right here in America. 218
The complexity of the slave trade as a whole (or the vastness of the
universe of human injustice in its entirety) is not a good excuse for
avoiding responsibility where culpability is clear.
E. "No Harm, No Foul ": Tort Law and the Feedback Loop
Tort law can have the effect of cementing in place our ideas
about what harm looks like. 219 The concepts of harm and duty are
intermixed in the "too big to remedy" cases. These cases suggest that
where the harm is too big to address, there is no duty. This creates a
potential ripple effect: members of society may take away the
214. Eugene Volokh, More Reparations, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Nov. 13, 2003, 3:40 AM),
http://volokh.com/2003_11_09_volokharchive.html; FLAHERTY & CARLISLE, supra note 197, at
18, 28-30 (suggesting that reparations would require payment to a variety of other groups,
including Irish immigrants).
215. 164 N.E. 564 (N.Y. 1928).
216. See BROOKS, supra note 9, at xi ("The [American] government came forward in short
order with $3 billion for the 3,016 people who died in the attacks on the World Trade Center and
the Pentagon."). See generally FEINBERG, supra note 151 (discussing the history and functioning
of the 9/11 Victim Compensation Fund).
217. Cf Galanter, supra note 2, at 122 (noting that there is an endless supply of historical
injustice).
218. BROOKS, supra note 9, at ix-xi.
219. Anne Bloom, To Be Real: Sexual Identity Politics in Tort Litigation, 88 N.C. L. REV.
357, 382-413 (2010) (discussing ways in which tort law can construct and reinforce social
narratives about the reality of claimants' sexual identities and the value of their claims).
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message that there was no duty to abstain from the racist and
invidious behaviors associated with slavery and Jim Crow.
Similarly, because remedy and injury are mutually
constitutive,22 0 people will to some extent define injury backward
from the existence of a legal remedy. Under that definition, an injury
is something that the legal system addresses. 221 Thus, if there is no
legal harm, then there was no foul to begin with. And if that is the
case, then the lack of a remedy could undermine the perceived moral
value of the underlying claims in a negative feedback loop.
This becomes a self-reinforcing narrative, where denial of
restitution sends an important message. Because no recovery is given
by the courts, the majority views this as evidence that the claims are
not required by justice. And after all, justice itself is also a social
construct. Ultimately, tort claims can become a sort of surrogate for
the line between frivolous and real claims, and as such, a proxy
indicator of a claim's moral strength. Courts will then be both a
barometer and a catalyst-eventually both mirroring and reinforcing
public opinion. 222
Jennifer Wriggins notes that when a society decides that an
injury really needs to be compensated, it will generally find a way to
provide restitution.223 For example, auto insurance is one complex
vehicle for compensation; it allows society to address the harms of
auto accidents.224 Ultimately, then, society makes policy choices
about what exactly is too big to remedy. Thus, it is a deliberate
choice that "tort rules reflect a devaluation of particular social
groups." 225 Indeed, as Galanter notes, the concept of justice can arise
220. See Galanter, supra note 101, at 1.
221. See Nockleby, Faces, supra note 168 (discussing ways that filters result in not all claims
being addressed); see also Nockleby, Access, supra note 168 (noting that many victims of harm
lack real access to any judicial remedy).
222. See generally BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: How PUBLIC OPINION HAS
INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT (2009) (providing a detailed historical analysis of how the
American people came to shape the role played by the Supreme Court justices, thus defining the
terms of their constitutional democracy).
223. Jennifer Wriggins, Sumner T. Bernstein Professor of Law and Associate Dean for
Research, University of Maine School of Law, Panelist at the Loyola Law Review Symposium:
Injuries Without Remedies (Mar. 26, 2010).
224. Jennifer Wriggins, Automobile Injuries as Injuries with Remedies: Driving, Insurance,
Torts and Changing the "Choice Architecture" ofAuto Insurance Pricing, 44 LOy. L.A. L. REV.
69, 74-76 (2010).
225. Chamallas, supra note 123, at 1437.
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from the conversations that clarify the standard. 226 While this can
expand views of justice, it can also limit or contract them; denial of
restitution can then reinscribe the harm.
The objection that certain harms are too big or too complex to
remedy paints a false dichotomy with other remediable harms that
are neither big nor complex and do not take time to address. And yet,
as Galanter notes, "justice tolerates some passage of time," and "the
ordinary administration of justice assumes that some delay is
unavoidable." 22 7 Reparations claims are not unique in seeking a
remedy after the passage of time.
Reparations advocates thus face a problematic feedback loop.
Causation rules, a societal construction, limit recovery. However, the
result of nonrecovery serves to reinforce those sorts of ideas about
causation and may bleed over into society's views on other aspects
of the claims, including whether any harm occurred in the first place.
How can advocates break this cycle? There have been a few
instances of shifts in thinking about and perception of causation. For
example, with tort claims stemming from tobacco usage, courts were
unreceptive for decades. 228 However, attorneys were able to break
through with some claims, and then suddenly the dam broke. Now
causation and harm in tobacco cases are widely accepted. 229 Slavery
differs in many ways. Securing a change in the public and legal
perceptions of causation in the slavery context may require the
creative use of remedies.
V. RETHINKING RESTITUTION: REMEDYING THE IRREMEDIABLE
This part will explore some potential responses to the harms of
slavery and Jim Crow.
A. Political Limits
Public opinion on reparations is very negative. As Brophy notes,
"When the Mobile Register polled Alabama citizens in the summer
of 2002, it found that the question of reparations was the most
racially divisive issue it had ever studied. ... Only 5% of white
226. Galanter, supra note 2, at 117.
227. Id. at 111.
228. Sebok, supra note 4, at 1410-11.
229. Id. at 1411-12.
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Alabamians support reparations for slavery from the federal
government, but 67% of black Alabamians support them." 230 Given
political realities, reparations may be politically impossible. 231
Interest convergence may mean that political challenges will be
particularly difficult to overcome. Interest convergence suggests that
there are no truly altruistic actions and that white contributions to
Black progress happen despite white intent, not because of it.m2 2
Decisions like Brown came about only when white political elites felt
that they were necessary to achieve the "economic and political
advances at home and abroad that would follow abandonment of
segregation." 23 3 The same can be said about abolition itself-it only
happened when it was in whites' interests to do so, that is, when the
230. BROPHY, supra note 4, at 4; see also Taunya Lovell Banks, Exploring White Resistance
to Racial Reconciliation in the United States, 55 RUTGERS L. REv. 903, 915-17 (2003)
(discussing demographics of Americans opposed to reparations); Alfred L. Brophy, The Cultural
War over Reparations for Slavery, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1181, 1182-84 (2004) (discussing the
Mobile Register survey and the controversial nature of reparations in general);Michael Kranish,
Blacks Rally on Capital for Slavery Reparations: Farrakhan Seeks Transfer of Land, BOSTON
GLOBE, Aug. 18, 2002, at A3 (discussing findings from a CNN and USA Today Gallup Poll in
February 2002 that found that "90 percent of white respondents opposed cash payments by the
government, while 55 percent of black respondents supported the idea").
231. Jack Greenberg, Reparations: Politically Inconceivable, 29 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 157,
159 (2006).
232. Bell's theory of interest convergence was first proposed in 1980, in both an influential
article and an equally influential treatise. See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education
and the Interest- Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REv. 518, 524 (1980). The idea was
originally presented at a conference in 1978. See id. at 518 n.al. Since then, dozens of other
writers have expanded on the theory, making it one of Critical Race Theory's most important
contributions to legal scholarship. See, e.g., Mary L. Dudziak, Desegregation as a Cold War
Imperative, 41 STAN. L. REV. 61, 62-66 (1988). The first edition of Bell's treatise was published
in 1973, but the more influential second edition was published in 1980, around the same time as
the Brown v. Board ofEducation article. See DERRICK A. BELL, RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN
LAW 9-12 (Vicki Been et. al. eds., 6th ed. 2008) [hereinafter BELL, RACISM AND AMERICAN
LAW] (discussing interest convergence theory and its development). See generally DERRICK
BELL, SILENT COVENANTS: BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCA TION AND THE UNFULFILLED HOPES FOR
RACIAL REFORM 49-68, 106 (2004) [hereinafter BELL, SILENT COVENANTS] (discussing Brown
and the importance of interest convergence theory).
233. Bell, supra note 232, at 524. This theme has been further developed by later writers. See,
e.g., Dudziak, supra note 232, at 62-66 (developing a historical argument to support Bell's
interest-convergence idea that Brown v. Board of Education came about because of white
political necessity).
Specifically, desegregation would allow America to assert a moral high ground in its
cold war with Russia, would allow the economy of the South to become more fully developed,
and would calm the unrest among American Black veterans of World War II, which threatened to
undermine national stability. See BELL, SILENT COVENANTS, supra note 232, at 59-68; see also
Dudziak, supra note 232, at 77-84 (discussing moral high ground and Black veterans).
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white benefit from freeing slaves outweighed the white loss in doing
SO. 234
Interest convergence likely underlies some of the resistance to
reparations. Derrick Bell argued, in his review of Bittker, that white
self-interest would prevent reparations. 235 Rhonda Magee argues that
reparations for Blacks have been ignored because there is no white
self-interest in such reparations and that inherent racism in the
political system drives inattention to reparations.236 Magee argues
that Japanese American redress came because of interest
convergence relating to trade with Japan; as she notes, no similar
pressure exists for Blacks.237
Similarly, Bell's story of the space traders illustrates ways in
which majority society is willing to sacrifice the interests of minority
groups if the majority's self-interest dictates. 238 It is a parable that
describes a world in which fictitious space aliens trade gold,
resources, and technology for Blacks in America, who are led away
in chains. 239 The moral is clear: majority society will sell out the
interests of minority groups if this benefits the majority. 240
These political hurdles have proved insurmountable for many
political reparations efforts, including Representative John Conyers's
proposed H.R. 40, which would put in place a commission to study
the effects of slavery. 241 Advocates have experimented with alternate
approaches, which may provide a level of flexibility, a type of
"political cy pres," 2 4 2 to avoid the problem of political intractability.
234. BELL, SILENT COVENANTS, supra note 232, at 50-58; see BELL, RACISM AND
AMERICAN LAW, supra note 232, at 44-45.
235. See Derrick Bell, Jr., Dissection of a Dream, 9 HARV. C.R-C.L. L. REV. 156, 162-65
(1974) (reviewing BORIS I. BIT-TKER, THE CASE FOR BLACK REPARATIONS (1973)); see also
Magee, supra note 16, at 908-09 (discussing Bell's analysis).
236. Magee, supra note 16, at 908-12.
237. Id. at 908-09.
238. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., After We're Gone: Prudent Speculations on America in a Post-
Racial Epoch, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY, THE CUTTING EDGE 2, 3-5 (Richard Delgado & Jean
Stefancic eds., 2d ed. 2000).
239. Id.
240. See id.
241. See BROPHY, supra note 4, at 12, 143 (discussing H.R. 40); see also Brophy, supra note
230, at 1185 (same).
242. I am indebted to Bryon Steir for this idea.
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B. Need for New, Creative Remedies
Since traditional tort remedies are not going to be sufficient-
and even those insufficient remedies are not being given-advocates
must focus on new and creative approaches. There are many
potential responses or second-best solutions, not all of them located
in the legal system. 243
However, in a variety of ways, law can continue to advance the
movement, even if the tort claims themselves fail. The following
sections discuss the potential remedies of storytelling,
microreparations, and community-focused reparations. These
remedies are imperfect in different ways. However, an imperfect
remedy is better than no remedy at all. 244
Orly Lobel's work illustrates the potential gain from new
collaborations between public and private approaches, in which law
serves a problem-solving function rather than providing all of the
remedies sought. In a cooperative regime, "[t]he role of government
changes from regulator and controller to facilitator and coordinator,"
and "[1]aw becomes a process of shared problem-solving rather than
an ordering activity." 24 5 Drawing on the work of a number of diverse
scholars, Lobel examines the potential for this new governance
approach in a variety of fields, including workplace safety,
antidiscrimination law, and environmental regulation. Lobel notes
that
[a] recurring theme of the new model is that state and
government agencies should learn from the practices of
private organizational models and market-based
management theories. The use of private firms as an
analogy to other social spheres reflects the growing opinion
that broad developments in the market economy trigger
direct changes in law. In many contexts, the
interconnections between the object of regulation (the
243. Galanter notes that different approaches-including balancing, apology, and revenge-
provide a number of ways to frame a remedy. See Galanter, supra note 101, at 2.
244. See Galanter, supra note 2, 123-24, 125 n.16 (arguing that, while proposed solutions
may be flawed, acquiescence in injustice is worse). Galanter notes that "[w]hen it comes to
justice, we don't have the choice of the unbroken vase. A patched and blemished world is the
only one we can attain." Id. at 124.
245. Orly Lobel, Crowding Out or Ratcheting Up? Fair Trade Systems, Regulation and New
Governance, in FAIR TRADE, CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY AND BEYOND: EXPERIMENTS IN
GLOBALIZING JUSTICE 313, 319 (Kate MacDonald & Shelley Marshall eds., 2010).
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economy) and the strategy by which it is regulated (law)
motivate the push for renewal through the adoption of
market practices in the public sphere. 246
In fact, advocates have already noted ways that new governance
approaches can address some of the concerns of tort and causation.
For instance, Amy Cohen notes that some scholars have discussed
ways that new governance approaches could seek to "remedy
historical injustices that elude individual causation." 247
Creative remedies may not always provide the same sorts of
outcomes as tort liability, but they may also be more effective than
traditional legal responses in some areas. For instance, they could
focus on remedying the harms of white privilege. 2 48 In doing so,
these remedies could advance the anti-subordination goals of Critical
Race Theorists. 249
C. Storytelling
One important tool is storytelling. Richard Delgado has argued
that storytelling can be used to challenge prevailing ideas about race
in a way that gives voice to minority groups, which are often
excluded from the traditional legal framework and discussion. 250
Of course, storytelling can and often does take place in the court
system. In the court system, storytelling can allow individuals the
psychological and emotional benefits from the catharsis of sharing
their stories and the opportunity to voice claims. 251 It can allow
246. Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in
Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REv. 342, 365-66 (2004).
247. Amy J. Cohen, Governance Legalism: Hayek and Sabel on Reason and Rules,
Organization and Law, 2010 Wis. L. REv. 357, 387.
248. Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., To the Bone: Race and White Privilege, 83 MINN. L. REV.
1637, 1638-40 (1999).
249. See Kimberld Crenshaw, A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Law and
Politics, in PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS IN THE LAW 339, 339-43 (David M. Adams ed., 4th ed.
2005) (noting that Critical Race Theory exposes the facets of law and legal discourse that create
racial categories and legitimate racial subordination); Culp, supra note 248, at 1638.
250. Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87
MICH. L. REv. 2411, 2413-14 (1989); Richard Delgado, When a Story Is Just a Story: Does
Voice Really Matter?, 76 VA. L. REV. 95, 95-96 (1990).
251. See Adam S. Zimmerman, Funding Irrationality, 59 DuKE L.J. 1105, 1129 (2010)
(noting "the political and psychological value that comes with meaningful participation in a
formal court process"); see also Tom R. Tyler, A Psychological Perspective on the Settlement of
Mass Tort Claims, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1990, at 204 ("[H]aving one's day in
court often leads to a more satisfactory claiming experience than does a swift procedure in which
litigants are minimally involved.").
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parties to have "transformative exchanges about . .. social and moral
values." 252 Anne Bloom notes that Agent Orange veterans were
discontent with class-action resolution because "the veterans wanted
to tell their stories and have them heard by a court of law." 253
In the reparations context, storytelling serves another important
function, that of education and consciousness-raising. Storytelling
can change public perception in important ways, such as reshaping
society's views to overcome political hurdles to reparations.
One problem is that most Americans think (wrongly) that they
already know everything there is to know about slavery and Jim
Crow, as well as about race issues generally. 254 This perception can
be challenged by storytelling. 255 That type of approach worked very
effectively for Japanese Americans. The storytelling about Japanese
American internees and about wrongful conviction was jarring and
caught the public's attention. 256
Slavery reparations can take the same tack-attacking myths
such as the idea that slavery was limited to the South, that it cleanly
ended in 1865, or that it was a minor part of U.S. history. The
abysmally low level of white support 25 7 reflects in part an
impoverished public understanding of the breadth and effects of
slavery. As Brooks notes, "When whites reject reparations on the
ground that they had nothing to do with slavery, they fail to
252. Zimmerman, supra note 94 (manuscript at 14).
253. Anne Bloom, From Justice to Global Peace: A (Brief) Genealogy of the Class Action
Crisis, 39 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 719, 749 (2006).
254. Even well-educated readers are often terribly underinformed. In a nonscientific blog poll,
I found that a large number of readers had never heard of major Jim Crow acts of violence like
the Tulsa Race Riot. See Kaimipono D. Wenger, Knowledge of Jim Crow Events: A Quick,
Informal Survey, CONCURRING OPINIONS (May 18, 2009, 11:15 PM),
http://www.concurringopinions.con/archives/2009/05/knowledge-of-jim-crow-events-an-
informal-survey.html.
255. See Eric L. Muller, Fixing a Hole: How the Criminal Law Can Bolster Reparations
Theory, 47 B.C. L. REV. 659, 660-61 (2005) (discussing recent publications that challenge the
mainstream consensus that certain historical events should be condemned as injustices); Eric
Yamamoto et. al., American Reparations Theory and Practice at the Crossroads, 44 CAL. W. L.
REV. 1, 48 n.240 (2007) (noting that listening and storytelling are crucial to the healing-through-
justice process).
256. See generally ERIC K. YAMAMOTO ET AL., RACE, RIGHTS AND REPARATION: LAW AND
THE JAPANESE AMERICAN INTERNMENT 258-441 (2001) (discussing the experience of Japanese
American internees).
257. See supra note 230 and accompanying text.
222
TOO BIG TO REMEDY?
understand the centrality of slavery in the socioeconomic
development of this great country."2 58
Americans disagree about the history of slavery. 259 As Ariela
Gross notes, people often subscribe to very different versions of
history and of the role of slavery in the country's history. 260 Different
sides have not only different conclusions about but also different
perceptions of the relevant underlying facts and history. 261
Many people today associate slavery exclusively with stories of
plantations and the South. Few people are aware of the widespread
use of and history of slavery outside of that context. White
filmmaker Katrina Browne attacks that myth in her work, explaining
that slavery "was the foundation of our country, not some Southern
anomaly. We all inherit responsibility." 26 2 Browne's film documents
the way that her own Northern family's wealth and political power
were based on its ties to the slave trade. 263
Similarly, Theodore Kornweibel, Jr. recounts the little known
story of railroad slavery.264 Use of slave labor "was nearly universal
on antebellum southern railroads,"2 65 which often rented slaves from
plantations. 266 Railroad slavery was difficult and dangerous work. 267
Female slaves on railroads were expected to perform the same hard
labor as men but were also subject to sexual exploitation. 268 Railroad
work took a great toll on slave families, which were often broken up
due to the demands of railroad labor. 269 As Kornweibel notes, in
comparison to plantation work, "[b]y every criterion, railroad slavery
258. BROOKS, supra note 9, at 148.
259. See, e.g., Horowitz, supra note 209, at 704.
260. Ariela Gross, When Is the Time of Slavery? The History of Slavery in Contemporary
Legal and Political Argument, 96 CALIF. L. REv. 283, 284-87 (2008).
261. Id. at 303-05; see also BROPHY, supra note 4, at 176 (arguing that advocates and
skeptics need to find consensus on the issues of harm).
262. Advocates Quietly Push for Slavery Repayment, USA TODAY, July 9, 2006,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2006-07-09-slavery-reparationsx.htm.
263. See id.
264. Theodore Kornweibel, Jr., Reparations and Railroads, 29 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 219,
221 (2007).
265. Id.
266. Id. at 222.
267. Id. at 224.
268. Id. at 225.
269. Id. at 228.
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was worse."27 0 Storytelling by voices like Browne's and
Kornweibel's combats the perception that slavery's impact was
limited and regional. It also combats the idea that only a small
number of Southern whites benefited from slavery. 271
One avenue for official storytelling is through proposed studies
about slavery, such as Conyers's bill. 272 As Brophy notes, such a
study could "lay the groundwork for a national consensus on
reparations and also serve a cathartic purpose, which would offer
emotional closure for victims."2 73 Brooks suggests creating a national
slavery museum to "commemorate the contributions slaves made to
our country and educate Americans about them, as well as about the
lingering effects slavery has on [B]lacks today."2 74  Statues,
memorials, and other forms of public recognition would dovetail
with the storytelling approach. 275 For instance, I have suggested
elsewhere that the Senate and House should make their recent
apology for slavery more sincere by setting aside Juneteenth as a
national holiday. 276
Similarly, storytelling can expand an understanding of the law's
role in addressing mass harms. Conyers has written that advocates
must "expand the concept of reparations. "277 He suggests, as one
instance of such expansion, that "[d]ealing with Katrina is a
reparations concept."2 78 Contrary to popular perception, there have
been many instances of mass restitution in history, and such acts do
270. Id. at 226.
271. For example, David Horowitz argues: "Did a dirt-poor squatter in the Dakota territory
circa 1860 really get some kind of psychological boost from the fact that Blacks were enslaved
two thousand miles away?" DAVID HOROWITZ, UNCIVIL WARS: THE CONTROVERSY OVER
REPARATIONS FOR SLAVERY 81 (2002).
272. See BROPHY, supra note 4, at 170 (discussing truth commissions).
273. Brophy, supra note 34, at 537.
274. BROOKS, supra note 9, at 157.
275. See Galanter, supra note 2, at 108 (discussing the use of statues and memorials to show
society's "repudiation of hatred, prejudice, and violence inflicted on racial, ethnic, or religious
grounds"). Cf Alfred Brophy, I Don't Know Why Jack Chin Says Goodbye; the Virginia
Legislature Says Hello, CONCURRING OPINIONS (Nov. 15, 2005, 8:58 PM),
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2005/ 1/idontknow why 1 .html#more-14820
(discussing the Virginia legislature's modest grant-$5 per grave per year-for maintaining
graves of Confederate soldiers).
276. Wenger, supra note 121, at 11.
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not always involve money payments to individuals. 279 The reality is,
as Brophy and others have demonstrated, that legislatures have
granted compensation to many harmed classes without requiring a
strict causal connection; there has been a "common practice of
legislatures to allow a weakening of the connections between
wrongdoers and payers." 28 0 Thus, Brophy defines reparations as
"legislative and court action designed to address historic
injustices."281
A better understanding of the broad scope of reparations refutes
the claim that they are unique or unprecedented. A better
understanding of and broader definition of reparations also answers
some of the concerns of interest convergence. When we expand the
concept of racial justice, such as to include responses to Katrina,
society may view the concept more favorably. No one opposes
rebuilding after Katrina. To the extent that a broader definition of
reparations allows majority citizens to identify with and support
reparations projects, it becomes a way to potentially change the low
public support for reparations.
Storytelling can sometimes be more valuable than legal
victories. For instance, the Alexander litigation failed. However,
Tulsa has been a success in important ways. The state commission
has led to unprecedented acceptance of blame. 282 The web site
continues to raise consciousness. 283 The Tulsa case may have been
dismissed, but the storytelling of the Tulsa report is a form of
reparations itself. That is a reparations success story. 284 Building on
those kinds of stories is the future of the movement. As Brooks
279. BROPHY, supra note 4, at 19-52 (discussing reparations history). Brophy also notes that
"most reparationists construe reparations more broadly." Alfred L. Brophy, Reconsidering
Reparations, 81 IND. L.J. 811, 823 (2006). Brophy criticizes a narrower definition suggested by
Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule that reparations are backward-looking only and limited in
practice to post-1946 programs that are monetary in nature. Id at 816-25.
280. Brophy, supra note 279, at 828.
281. BROPHY, supra note 4, at xiii. To illustrate, Brophy provides an in-depth chart showing
dozens of different instances of reparations. Id. at 30-33.
282. See Miller, supra note 9, at 60-65 (discussing Tulsa).
283. See Okla. Historical Soc'y, supra note 18 ("One of the great tragedies of Oklahoma
history, the Tulsa race riot has lived on as a potent symbol of the ongoing struggle of black and
white Oklahomans to forge a common destiny out of an often troubled past.").
284. See MINOW, supra note 109, at 93 ("The process of seeking reparations, and of building
communities of support while spreading knowledge of the violations and their meaning in
people's lives, may be more valuable, ultimately, than any specific victory or offer of a remedy.")
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suggests in Atonement and Forgiveness, storytelling "provides the
factual foundation for apology." 28 5
The ultimate goal, after all, is not any particular legal victory. It
is rebuilding the community. Reparations are an "essential criterion
for the restoration of social harmony between communities .... 286
This rationale provides whites with a reason to support reparations-
a vital step, given the problems of interest convergence.
Storytelling is especially important because of the limits that
recent Supreme Court jurisprudence has placed on race-based
benefits to individuals. 287 It is likely that reparations payments to
individuals would be challenged as unconstitutional. 288 However,
there is no constitutional limit on storytelling.
This can lead to a better understanding of what the law does and
what it should do. There is always the chance that claims can be
reconceived in a way that places them within the ambit of the law.
As Galanter suggests, storytelling may allow people "to be sensitized
by contemplation of the past to the traces of past wrongs that infect
the present according to [their] own standards."28 9 Or, our
understanding of the law may evolve such that claims would be
viewed as subjects of redress. As Saito notes:
If we were to start by attempting to understand, in human
terms, what has happened to whom, why it happened, who
is responsible, and what would come closest to repairing the
wrong ... a vision of substantive justice might emerge that
can then be correlated to the core legal principles
285. BROOKS, supra note 9, at 148.
286. Linda Keller, Seeking Justice at the International Criminal Court: Victims' Reparations,
29 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 189, 190 (2007) (quoting Claude Jorda & Jerome de Hemptinne, The
Status and Role of the Victim, in 2 THE ROME STATUTE: OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT: A COMMENTARY 1387, 1398 (Antonio Casesse et al. eds., 2002)).
287. See BROPHY, supra note 4, at 158-60 (discussing constitutional limits); Meera E. Deo,
The Promise of Grutter: Diverse Interactions at the University of Michigan Law School (Feb.
2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://works.bepress.com/meeradeoll (discussing
constitutional limits on affirmative action in education).
288. See BROPHY, supra note 4, at 158-64 (discussing constitutionality of reparations).
289. GALANTER, supra note 2, at 121. Similarly, it can allow for a better understanding of the
shifting expectations of justice. Society's views of right and wrong have shifted, with a greater
emphasis on rights, empathy, and responsibility. Id. at 117 (discussing shifts in society's views),
120 (discussing the move towards greater empathy); see also BROOKS, supra note 9, at ix-x
(noting the expanded use of apology).
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articulated in the Constitution and the foundational
instruments of human rights and humanitarian law. 290
D. Restorative and Community Approaches
There are a variety of promising restorative-and community-
based-approaches.
One of these is microreparations. At the same time that public
support in polls remains low, different varieties of localized
reparations programs have become increasingly popular. Indeed, one
striking feature of Pro and Con is a detailed chart documenting the
increase in these programs over the past ten years. 291 The popularity
of microreparations is unaffected by the public distrust of more
broad-scale reparations. As one of the few bright spots for
reparationists, microreparations present a stark contrast with the
failed lawsuits, failed legislation, and alarmingly low poll support for
broad-scale reparations. Further work needs to be done to catalogue
these microreparations efforts and analyze their effects and
potential. 292
Another promising avenue is restorative justice. Restorative
justice is "focused on attempting to make the victim and society
whole." 29 3 Linda Keller writes that "[r]estorative justice tends to be
community-oriented, aimed at restoring society through
reconciliation. It may take the form of truth commissions and
symbolic gestures of atonement and forgiveness between victim and
perpetrator . . . ."2 94 As I note in another article: "Restorative justice,
a concept drawn from the international human rights context, is not
focused on punishment or on the redistribution of wealth; rather,
restorative justice seeks to repair society through reconciliation,
290. Saito, supra note 90, at 303.
291. BROPHY, supra note 4, at 30-32. Surprisingly, Brophy gives this topic relatively little
further analysis in Pro and Con. A few instances (such as Rosewood and Tulsa) are addressed
briefly. See id. at 3, 12, 50. However, Brophy does not discuss the microreparations movement in
detail.
292. I do some of this in my draft article Towards Microreparations. See Wenger, supra note
20.
293. Keller, supra note 286, at 191; see also BROOKS, supra note 9, at 141 (noting the racial
reconciliation will rely on restorative justice ideas).
294. Keller, supra note 286, at 190; see also Magee, supra note 16, at 913 (arguing that
reparations would have a powerful symbolic value and would be an "extreme expression of
official responsibility" but, because of that, they are particularly susceptible to majority attack).
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ultimately healing both victims and society itself."295 Thus,
"restorative justice seeks to repair the injustice, to make up for it, and
to effect corrective changes in the record . ." 296 This can ultimately
lead to reconciliation and community healing. 297 Solomon makes a
similar argument, noting that civil justice includes a moral and
restorative quality:
Consistent with the inescapable moral quality of the word
"justice". . . I would postulate that the injuries common to
civil and criminal justice are moral injuries. They are moral
injuries because they violate our terms of interaction and
social bonds, our obligations to others .... [T]he wrongs in
both civil and criminal justice constitute abuses of our own
liberty at the expense of others' security and well-being, or
in Kantian terms, use others as means to our ends. 298
Another promising approach is atonement. Atonement provides
a moral foundation for reparations claims. The idea of atonement
comes from the religious context and signifies a few different
interrelated concepts. It is a setting straight of records, a
reconciliation. 299 It also implies an expiatory act, an act designed to
heal harms done in the past, a religious sacrifice. 300 Similar to a
religious atonement, reparations involve sacrifices designed to show
contrition, to cleanse, and to make the community whole.
295. Wenger, supra note 121, at 3.
296. Id. (quoting MINOW, supra note 109, at 91); see also Keller, supra note 286, at 190-91
(describing restorative justice); see Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Peace and Justice: Notes on the
Evolution and Purposes ofLegal Processes, 94 GEO. L.J. 553, 575 (2006).
297. See generally YAMAMOTO ET AL., supra note 256, at 421-41 (discussing the experience
of Japanese American internees).
298. Solomon, supra note 100, at 326; see also Galanter, supra note 101, at 3 (noting that the
concept of injury is "morally infused").
299. BROOKS, supra note 9, at 143-47, 165-69. Brooks pointedly disavows the debt analogy
espoused by advocates like Robinson. Id at 14, 138-43.
300. The English word "atonement" is, quite literally, a creation of Christian theology and
history. William Tyndale, when first translating the Bible into English, was unable to find a noun
in the impoverished language of his time that adequately conveyed the sense of moral and
spiritual reconciliation in the biblical narrative of Jesus-and so he made a word up. Prior to
Tyndale's time, the verb "atone" simply meant to set records straight, such as with a financial
partner. Tyndale adapted the existing word "atone" and created the noun "atonement"; in the
process, he infused them both with new moral meaning. "Atonement" became a word
representing the religious act of Jesus paying for the sins of the world; more broadly, the idea of
atonement came to represent a form of moral cleansing and reconciliation. See generally Paul S.
Fiddes, Salvation and Atonement, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY 176,
178 (John Webster et al. eds., 2007).
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Atonement focuses on community healing. "[A]tonement can
heal old wounds that otherwise might be left to fester," writes
Brooks. 3' To accomplish this, an apology comes first, emphasizing
the focus on reconciliation. 302 Reparations then make the apology
believable. 303 This creates an environment of healing and
forgiveness. When this happens, Blacks will have a reason to buy
into the legal system and the community. Thus, by decreasing racism
and racial tension, atonement helps all of society. " Brooks writes,
"atonement-apology and reparation-plus forgiveness leads to
racial reconciliation." 305 Atonement offers the best moral framework
for reparations advocates going forward. 306
Other possibilities exist, like importing the idea of
ho'oponopono-the traditional Hawaiian concept of reconciliation
among members of a family or community-into the reparations
context. 30' The process is described in detail by Rebecca Tsosie, who
notes:
Native Hawaiian peoples have a long tradition of resolving
interpersonal conflicts through a process called
"Ho'oponopono," which means "to make right." This
process has been used within families to heal the wounds
caused by particular transgressions. The healing process is
both emotional and spiritual and is premised upon the idea
that the perpetrator and the person wronged are bound
together in a relationship of negative entanglement called
"hihia." This tangling of emotions hinders forgiveness, and
thus, the healing process must untangle these negative
301. BROOKS, supra note 9, at 170.
302. Id at 142. Brooks notes that "Racial reconciliation should be the primary purpose of
slave redress." Id. at 141. He also writes that "[o]nly apology is sufficiently endowed to perform
such heavy moral lifting." Id. at 142; see also Wenger, supra note 121, at 2-4 (discussing the uses
and limits of apologies).
303. BROOKS, supra note 9, at 142-43.
304. See Wenger, supra note 8, at 241-44.
305. BROOKS, supra note 9, at 143; see also id. at 148-51 (discussing atonement as a chance
to clarify the historical record).
306. See id. at 141-69 (discussing Brooks's atonement model). Brophy discusses the moral
strength of Brooks's model. See BROPHY, supra note 4, at 73-74, 149; see also Anthony E. Cook,
King and the Beloved Community: A Communitarian Defense of Black Reparations, 68 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 959, 977-78 (2000) (also discussing moral basis for reparations).
307. See Andrew J. Hosmanek, Cutting the Cord: Ho'oponopono and Hawaiian Restorative
Justice in the Criminal Law Context, 5 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 359, 359-68 (2005) (discussing
history and current uses of ho'oponopono).
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emotions to facilitate a mutual understanding of the
emotional truth of what happened, a sincere appreciation of
the effects of the bad behavior, a confession of the
wrongdoing and seeking of forgiveness by the perpetrator,
and ultimately, the act of granting forgiveness and the
release of the negative emotions. 3
Ho'oponopono has the benefit of drawing on the traditions of another
marginalized group, and as such, may be an especially effective
tool. 309
Each of these approaches moves beyond the adversarial
framework and engages the community. 310 As Conyers notes, "we
have got to reach out beyond the African-American community." 3 11
Engaging with all views is a part of the process. By failing to
communicate with or appreciate arguments made by opponents, both
sides lose. Both sides miss out on the sort of internal vetting and
intellectual refinement that comes from addressing opposite views.
In addition, reparationists especially suffer, since they are in the
minority position and have the most to gain from engaging the other
side.
E. The Role ofLaw in Facilitating Creative Remedies
Thus far, law's engagement with reparations has come in the tort
framework. However, law can make invaluable contributions to these
alternate approaches.
Law can help increase the power of storytelling. This happened
in the Japanese American context. The legal strategy of attacking
wrongful convictions focused the public's attention on sympathetic
cases of clear injustice. The increased public consciousness of the
wrong helped contribute to a shift in perception, which ultimately led
to restitution.312 Similarly, Holocaust cases led to storytelling that
308. See Rebecca Tsosie, Sacred Obligations: Intercultural Justice and the Discourse of
Treaty Rights, 47 UCLA L. REv. 1615, 1666 (2000).
309. See Matsuda, supra note 51, at 368-73 (discussing Native Hawaiian restitution claims).
310. Each of these ideas relates to Matsuda's suggestion that law "look to the bottom" and
respond to the experiences of the oppressed. Id. at 324-25, 398-99.
311. Conyers, supra note 277, at 154.
312. See generally YAMAMOTO ET AL., supra note 256 (discussing the role of consciousness-
raising in the Japanese American context).
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raised public consciousness of previously unknown incidents. "
Some similar consciousness-raising may have already happened in
the slavery reparations context. The publicity from the failed tort
claims may have contributed to consciousness-raising or to shifts in
public opinions that contributed to the movement for
microreparations.
Law can reinforce microreparations efforts. For instance,
changes to the statute of limitations were vital in the
microreparations cases that facilitated some recovery for Armenian
genocide victims.31 Legal scholars must continue to examine the
microreparations phenomenon. "
Microreparations ordinances may provide opportunity for
additional storytelling or spotlighting. For instance, recent slavery
ordinances may provide a platform for storytelling in the context of
the law. These ordinances call for businesses to disclose past ties to
slavery. 316 Reparations advocates can use these as a platform by
bringing litigation or other enforcement actions. These kinds of
measures allow advocates to keep the spotlight on the issues without
opening the door to criticisms of individual plaintiffs. They also
allow for broader storytelling, as advocates can highlight the many
lesser-known links to slavery.
Other legal rights may provide the context for storytelling and
public consciousness-raising about slavery. For instance, Brophy has
written recently about rights to access graveyards. " This is an
evocative image, which may serve as a platform for storytelling and
consciousness-raising. Many stories remain to be told. For instance,
313. See Deborah Sturman, Germany's Reexamination of Its Past Through the Lens of the
Holocaust Litigation, in HOLOCAUST RESTITUTION: PERSPECTIVES ON THE LITIGATION AND ITS
LEGACY 215, 215-16 (Michael Bazyler & Roger P. Alford eds., 2006).
314. BROPHY, supra note 4, at 120 (discussing California's suspension of statute of
limitations in suits against insurance companies by descendants of the Armenian genocide
victims).
315. A limited amount of discussion has already occurred. For instance, Brophy briefly
addresses whether smaller endeavors, called truth commissions, are enough. See id. at 170-71. I
address this and other questions in some depth in my draft article Towards Microreparations. See
Wenger, supra note 20.
316. See BROPHY, supra note 4, at 143-47.
317. Id. at 133. See generally Alfred L. Brophy, Grave Matters: The Ancient Rights of the
Graveyard, 2006 BYU L. REv. 1469 (exploring in depth the long-standing right to visit the
graves of one's ancestors).
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the East St. Louis riot story is, in some ways, as compelling as Tulsa
and may be the next microreparations front. 318
VI. CONCLUSION
The traditional tort model has not succeeded in securing
compensation for slavery. This failure illustrates some of the limits
of the law in addressing mass harms. However, the emergence of a
variety of creative potential remedies suggests that even for harms
like slavery, some sorts of legal responses may be beneficial. These
illustrate that, for a society intent on achieving social justice, no
harm is really too big to remedy.
318. BROPHY, supra note 4, at 133-35 (comparing and contrasting Tulsa's and East St.
Louis's reparations prospects).
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